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As gambling sites proliferate on the Internet and telephone gambling 
is legalized in more states, an increasingly large fraction of the public 
can place a bet without ever leaving home at all. Universally available, 
“round-the-clock” gambling may soon be a reality….  [T]he country has 
gone very far very fast regarding an activity the consequences of which, 
frankly, no one really knows much about.1
I. INTRODUCTION
{1}  It is estimated that 2003 global revenues for Internet gambling2 will approach $4.2 billion,3 while 
Internet gaming market growth for 2002-2003 was pegged at twenty percent.4  The majority of online 
gamblers in 2002 were American5 and fifty-four governments around the world currently sanction 
some form of Internet gaming.6  In the United States, however, state governments have, without 
exception, currently chosen to forbid most Internet gambling.7  Although state law enforcement agents 
have had some successes in confronting this formidable off-shore business,8 states are seeking the 
assistance of the federal government in order to regain control over the gaming activities that take 
place within their borders.  In response, Congress has not hesitated to propose a battery of Internet 
gambling legislation.
{2}  A common criticism of federal Internet gambling bills is that the bills seemingly represent a power 
grab by the federal government in the realm of gambling – a domain traditionally regulated by the 
states.9  The purpose of this paper is not only to examine whether further federal intervention in the 
realm of Internet gambling would be consistent with past federal gaming policy, but also to address the 
specific aspects of past and present Congressional bills that are most promising in tackling non-tribal 
Internet gambling.10
{3}  The first step in this analysis is to recognize that Internet gambling did not arise in a legal vacuum. 
On the contrary, federal gambling policy has a long and complicated history.  Consequently, instead of 
devising novel legal frameworks for online gaming, Part II of this paper considers Congress’s historical 
approach towards gambling and discerns a few trends in federal gaming policy.  Part III explores the 
risks of online gaming using the example of Internet casinos and concludes that these risks need not 
necessarily be greater than those presented by offline gaming.  The underlying federal policy towards 
online gaming should not, therefore, dramatically differ from the federal policy underlying offline 
gaming.  Part IV, however, will demonstrate that the federal approaches to online and offline gaming 
are not, in practice, consistent.  Consequently, reforms are necessary to bring current legislation and 
enforcement methods up to date with online gaming’s possibilities.  A series of reforms that have been 
presented in Congressional Internet gambling bills will be evaluated in Part V, using criteria such as 
consistency with past federal gambling policy, efficacy, and precedents for Internet regulation.  This 
paper concludes that Congress should target financial institutions associated with unlawful gambling in 
order to reinforce state gambling policies; however, federal law should be modified in order to permit 
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wagers to and from jurisdictions in which the gambling at issue is legal.  As in the past, states should 
remain the principle arbiters of gambling policy. 
{4}  This paper presents no conclusions as to whether online gaming is “good” or “bad.”  Gambling, 
in general, and online gaming, in particular, can be approached from a variety of angles.   There are 
economic, sociological and moral arguments that have been marshaled by proponents and opponents 
alike of various forms of gambling.11  These arguments, however, are not emphasized, because they are 
rarely unique to Internet gambling.  As Part III will demonstrate, Internet gaming is largely a variation 
on gambling rather than a new species of it.  The heart of the analysis rests on the assumption that it is 
the underlying acts of gambling that should or should not be punished, rather than the medium through 
which these acts are accomplished.
II. THE FEDERAL APPROACH TOWARDS GAMBLING
{5}  Gambling regulation is generally recognized as a state, rather than a federal, responsibility 
pursuant to the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.12  As one recently proposed piece 
of Congressional Internet gambling legislation noted: 
Since the founding of our country, the Federal Government has left gambling regulation 
to the States.  The last two Federal commissions Congress created to look into gambling 
have concluded that States are best equipped to regulate gambling within their own 
borders, and recommended that Congress continue to defer to the States in this respect.  
The Federal Government has largely deferred to the authority of States to determine the 
type and amount of gambling permitted.13  
Generally, there is a perception that gambling issues are best addressed at the local level,14 and all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted some form of gaming regulation, ranging from 
Nevada’s liberal policy to Utah and Hawaii’s bans.15  
{6}  In some situations in the past, federal legislation has addressed gambling in order to assist states 
with the enforcement of their own gambling legislation.  For example, the regulation of lotteries 
entailed some of the first federal regulatory forays into gambling.  Although critics in the nineteenth 
century argued that lottery bans were not enforceable16 (a criticism reminiscent of those leveled at 
Internet gambling regulations),17 only Missouri and Kentucky had not prohibited lotteries by 1862.18  
However, out-of-state lottery operators avoided state regulations by sending tickets to state residents 
through the mail.  The states, not able to regulate the postal system or to prosecute these out-of-state 
operators, could not effectively enforce their own anti-lottery policies.19  Such concerns prompted 
Congress, using its postal authority, to enact anti-lottery acts that banned sending lottery-related 
circulars20 and newspapers containing advertisements for lotteries through the mail.21  When one 
infamous lottery22 subsequently moved its operations to Honduras in an effort to avoid state and federal 
anti-lottery regulations, Congress again supported state anti-lottery policy in 1895 by passing the 
Federal Anti-Lottery Act,23 which limited the importation and interstate carriage of materials associated 
with gambling.24  
{7} This deference to and support of state gambling policy is also evident in more recent Congressional 
gambling-related legislation.  For example, Section 320905 of the Public Code, which was part of 
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,25 updated the modern incarnation of 
the aforementioned Federal Anti-Lottery Act26 in order “to protect the sovereignty of State lottery 
programs” by accounting for “advances in communication technology” and thus “preserving a State’s 
right to sell its own lottery tickets within its borders and exclude the sale of other States’ tickets.”27  
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Moving beyond lotteries, the Illegal Gambling Businesses Act, which was enacted as part of the 1970 
Crime Control Act, prohibited an “illegal gambling business,” defined as a gambling business that is 
in “violation of the law of a State . . . in which it is conducted.”28  By making this statute dependant 
upon state law, Congress allowed states to determine whether to permit or to prohibit certain forms 
of gambling, while providing federal support for those who opted for the latter.29  18 U.S.C. § 1511, 
which was also enacted as part of the 1970 Crime Control Act, states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for 
two or more persons to conspire to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political 
subdivision thereof, with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business.”30  It, too, was designed 
to assist states in the enforcement of their gambling laws by avoiding situations where corrupt local 
officials hamper enforcement.31   
{8}  Lest one think that the federal government, rather than deferring to state gambling policy, has 
merely used state enforcement weaknesses to push a federal anti-gambling policy, it is informative 
to examine the federal response when anti-lottery sentiment diminished in the 1960’s and 1970’s and 
several states began to authorize lotteries.32  This more favorable approach towards lotteries conflicted 
with the federal anti-lottery legislation that had once supported practically uniform state policies 
against lotteries.  The gap between some states’ support of lotteries and federal anti-lottery legislation 
even led the Department of Justice in 1974 to warn certain states’ governors that their states may have 
violated criminal provisions of federal law.33  Congress avoided a federal-state collision by enacting 
18 U.S.C. § 1307, an exception to federal law for state-operated lotteries that allowed the latter to 
use the mail and certain radio and television broadcasts for lottery promotions.  Congress thereby 
accommodated the pro-lottery policy of certain states while it continued to use its federal powers to 
limit lottery promotions falling outside of the narrow exception, thus supporting the policy of non-
lottery states.34
 
{9}  A Congressional commission that studied America’s national approach towards gambling in 1976 
offered the following statement of how the federal government should approach gambling policy:  
“[T]he States should have the primary responsibility for determining what forms of gambling may 
legally take place within their borders.  The Federal government should prevent interference by one 
State with the gambling policies of another, and should act to protect identifiable national interests.”35  
However, the “identifiable national interests” cited therein might provide the exception that swallows 
the rule.  In particular, there is a tension between federal deference to, and support of, state gambling 
policies and a perception of gambling as a breeding ground for organized crime and therefore a 
legitimate target of federal action.  Crime syndicates, which prospered during Prohibition, used illegal 
gambling as a source of wealth and continued to do so well after Prohibition’s repeal.36  In 1950, the 
Special Senate Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce emphasized the 
link between crime and gambling in a series of sensational hearings,37 and this association has been 
put forth to justify numerous Congressional pieces of legislation.
{10}  The Johnson Act,38 which regulated the interstate transport of certain gambling devices and 
required federal registration for gambling device manufacturers and dealers, sought to assist local 
law enforcement agents in combating “[n]ation-wide crime syndicates.”39 In addition, the Wire Act, 
prohibiting the interstate transmission of wagers, the Travel Act, prohibiting interstate and foreign 
“travel [or transportation] in aid of racketeering enterprises,” and the Wagering Paraphernalia Act, 
regulating interstate transportation of various gambling-related devices, were all subsequently 
enacted in 1961 as part of Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s war on organized crime.40  The 
Wagering Paraphernalia Act was designed “to provide means for the Federal Government to combat 
interstate crime and to assist the States in the enforcement of their criminal laws . . .,”41 while the 
Travel Act sought “to bring about a serious disruption in the far-flung organization and management 
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of coordinated criminal enterprises.”42  The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, enacted during 
President Nixon’s campaign against crime, followed the trend of legislation combating organized crime 
by targeting “illegal gambling businesses” regardless of whether there was an explicit connection with 
interstate commerce.43  The following year, the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Statute (RICO), which was designed to combat “the infiltration of organized crime [and racketeering] 
into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce,”44 included gambling violations as 
predicate acts for RICO prosecutions.
{11}  In a system in which some states have prohibited one form of gambling while others have 
not, federal gambling regulations will not be completely neutral.  Preventing “interference by one 
State with the gambling policies of another” has often meant protecting the anti-gambling policies of 
one state against the more favorable gambling policies of another state.45  For example, the United 
States Supreme Court applied the Wagering Paraphernalia Act to prohibit the transportation of New 
Hampshire sweepstake receipts into New York, where such sweepstakes where then illegal.46  If carried 
to an extreme, this approach might justify frequent federal intervention in a wide-range of gambling 
activities.  However, the federal government has, perhaps for pragmatic reasons and out of respect 
for a traditional federal-state balance, generally settled for policies that limit the size and reach of 
widespread gambling operations.  The Eleventh Circuit noted in United States v. Farris with respect 
to the Travel Act that Congress has adopted the viewpoint that “large-scale gambling is dangerous 
to federal interests wherever it occurs.”47  Although that quotation might seem to be in tension with 
traditional federal deference to state gambling policy, a House Judiciary Committee Report on the 
Illegal Gambling Business Act stated that the legislation’s intent:
is not to bring all illegal gambling activity within the control of the Federal 
Government, but to deal only with illegal gambling activities of major 
proportions . . . .  It is intended to reach only those persons who prey 
systematically upon our citizens and whose syndicated operations are so 
continuous and so substantial as to be of national concern.48
An emphasis on targeting “large-scale” operations has been echoed by Kevin DiGregory, the Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, in his Congressional testimony that “federal resources should be spent 
targeting large gambling operations -- and any organized crime involvement or fraud connected with 
such activities -- and other more serious offenses.” 49  Elsewhere, DiGregory has observed, with respect 
to Internet gambling prosecutions, “a combination of lack of resources and priorities within certain 
Federal districts and within the Justice Department. We have only so many resources and so many 
prosecutors to spread around.”50  
{12}  In addition to resource limitations on the federal government’s ability to prosecute gambling,51 
there are other policy-oriented reasons for limiting federal involvement.  G. Robert Blakey and Harold 
Kurland have written, “[t]he national policy toward gambling rests heavily on principles of federalism52 
. . . .  [T]he federal criminal statutes define narrow parameters of permissible activity, but afford the 
states sufficient flexibility to experiment.”53  Thus, even if Congress may, under the Constitution, have 
the power to prohibit large areas of gambling activities, it has adopted a more conservative approach 
towards the regulation of gambling operations.  The strands of federal gambling policy might be 
characterized as deference to state gaming policy, support of this policy, and the targeting of large-scale 
gaming operations in the interest of fighting crime.54 
 
III. REGULATED ONLINE GAMING: A VARIATION ON A THEME
{13}  Professor Larry Lessig has written, with respect to the Internet, that “the nature of the Net is set 
in part by its architectures, and that the possible architectures of cyberspace are many.”55  One might 
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similarly say with respect to Internet gaming that its possible architectures are also many.  Yet, one 
frequently encountered problem in the debate surrounding online gaming legislation is that distinctions 
between online and offline gambling are drawn based upon comparisons between regulated forms 
of offline gambling and unregulated forms of online gambling.  For example, unregulated Internet 
casinos might be compared to heavily regulated brick and mortar casinos, and the former are 
unsurprisingly found to be less safe from any number of angles.  However, the appropriate comparison 
is between unregulated online casinos and unregulated offline casinos or between regulated online 
casinos and regulated brick and mortar casinos.
{14}  Having highlighted some federal trends towards gambling in Part II, Part III questions whether 
these trends should be applied to Internet gaming.  In order to make this determination, one must 
decide whether Internet gaming is a unique and inherently dangerous form of gambling warranting 
a novel legislative framework.  If it is not, then there is little reason to deviate from the principles 
outlined in Part II for the sake of online gaming.  The following section uses the example of Internet 
casinos to demonstrate that frequently-cited problems with Internet gambling, including (1) fraud, 
(2) money-laundering, (3) pathological gambling, and (4) underage gambling,56 are not necessarily 
inherent to Internet gambling operations.  In particular, regulations similar to those imposed on offline 
casinos or devised specifically for the technological medium may limit Internet gambling’s risks.57
{15}  The example of Internet casinos was chosen because this form of online gaming arguably 
presents the greatest differences with offline gaming.  Whereas online sports betting is not inherently 
different with respect to the underlying gambling activity or gambling environment than, for example, 
sports betting over a telephone, Internet casinos have brought to the living room an activity once 
confined to entertainment palaces.58  Therefore, if it can be shown that the differences between online 
and offline Internet casinos are not sufficient to warrant novel gambling policy, then it might follow 
under a “greater includes the lesser” rationale that the fewer differences between other forms of online 
and offline gambling are even less adequate.  Thus, the implication of Part III is that the differences 
between online and offline gaming, in general, are not sufficient to warrant departures from the federal 
government’s traditional approach towards gaming regulation.  While online gaming poses certain 
possibilities and dangers, these possibilities and dangers differ in degree rather than in kind from those 
presented by offline gaming.59  
A. Fraud
{16}  Unregulated gambling “affords no protection to customers and no assurance of fairness or 
honesty in the operation of the gambling devices.”60  This concern about fraud is not unique to Internet 
casinos, but gaming commissions generally oversee offline casinos in the U.S. in order to ensure a fair 
treatment of gamblers.61  Integrity concerns about online gambling include Internet casino operators 
running off with deposits, refusing to pay winnings or misusing a client’s private information.62  In 
addition, it is extremely difficult for a gambler to verify whether the stated odds on a virtual game are 
accurate.63  An Internet casino could easily misrepresent these odds in order to make them seem more 
favorable to the gambler.
{17}  The ways of preventing fraud in Internet casinos are not very different from the ways in 
which fraud is limited in land-based casinos.64  These processes include licensing, inspections and 
accounting for revenues.  For example, under a proposed Australian regulatory framework, each State 
and Territory, among other requirements, would have to approve the “financial soundness, technical 
expertise and operational ability” of the operator, the licensing of “key personnel,” and income-
distribution arrangements.65  In Nevada, only licensed land-based casinos of a certain size would be 
able to operate online casinos.66  Licensing of Internet casinos might also include an examination of 
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the site’s software.67  In order to obtain a license from the Northern Territory of Australia, Lasseters 
Online, an Internet casino launched in 1998, was required to pass a series of hurdles, including 
approval of computer and control systems,68 licensing of key employees, financial controls that 
included keeping transaction records for seven years,69 player protection measures, and a prohibition 
on payments to a customer unless the player’s identity, age, and place of residence have been verified.70 
Fines for each violation are generally AUD $2,000.  
{18}  In short, there is little reason to believe that a state gaming commission’s regulation of its state’s 
online casinos could not control fraud to the same extent as offline casinos.  Furthermore, while 
licensing imposes costs upon Internet casinos, a government license may also provide a competitive 
advantage.  One survey reported that sixty percent of Americans believed that offshore Internet casinos 
were fixed, and this concern about fraud is likely to have negative economic consequences for the 
Internet casino industry.71  Licensing may translate into a more reputable image for certain Internet 
casinos and better business.72
B. Money-Laundering
{19}  Money-laundering is a process during which the origins of illegally-derived proceeds are 
concealed and attributed to legitimate sources.73  This process can be broken down into three stages:  
placement, layering, and integration.74  During the first stage, the illicitly-derived funds are either 
deposited in a financial institution or converted to other monetary instruments.75  This placement stage 
is the first point of entry of the funds into a legitimate financial stream.76  Since a sudden, significant 
amount of value may attract the attention of law enforcement agents, layering, the next stage, often 
involves breaking up and transferring these funds to different accounts and institutions in order to 
obscure the funds’ origins.  In order for layering to be successful, the criminal may take advantage 
of legislative loopholes or poor coordination between police forces across jurisdictions.77  The 
“integration” stage, during which the funds are used to purchase legitimate assets or to fund further 
activities, completes the money-laundering process.78
{20}  Unregulated Internet casinos may pose several money-laundering risks, particularly at the 
layering stage.79   The speed, international character, and possible anonymity of certain Internet 
gambling transactions, together with the potential of transferring large sums of money, may attract 
money launderers to online gambling operations.80  In addition, some Internet casinos “offer a broad 
array of financial services to their customers, such as providing credit accounts, fund transmittal 
services, check cashing services, and currency exchange services.”81  A possible laundering of money 
could take the following form:
A person in Australia could . . . deposit the proceeds of a drug sale onto his/her credit 
card, and then transfer the amount via the card to an online casino in a ‘tax haven.’  The 
casino opens an account for the person and the account is credited with the amount 
deposited.  The person gambles some of the money and the winnings (or losses) are 
credited (or debited) to the account.  When the person wishes to withdraw the money 
from the account the casino sends the funds back to the person’s credit card as winnings.  
The . . . money is now clean.82
Since law enforcement authorities must be able to monitor or review a business’s transactions in order 
to detect and prosecute money-laundering,83 and since the records of offshore gambling operators 
may be difficult for regulatory authorities in another jurisdiction to obtain, law enforcement agents in 
another jurisdiction would have no means of verifying the suspected money-launderer’s claims.84
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{21}  A money-launderer may not even have to place a bet in order to clean his funds.  Depending on 
the Internet casino, the criminal might be able to place his money in a casino account and then move 
the funds into another account as “winnings” without ever playing a game.85  While this example 
could work with an Internet gambling site that was oblivious to its client’s money-laundering activity, 
money-launderers may also try to operate their own Internet casinos.  In such a case, the criminal 
would transfer his funds to the site which would then deduct a small amount of money (a money 
laundering “fee”) and attribute the deduction to a “gaming loss.”  Without having placed a wager, the 
money-launderer, with the assistance of the Internet casino, would have been able to cloak the origin 
of the illegitimate funds.86
{22}  A further money-laundering risk, while not unique to Internet gambling operations,87 could be 
exacerbated by government regulations directed towards Internet gambling.  Proposed legislation 
in the U.S. that targets payment methods for Internet casinos may push customers towards more 
anonymous payment mechanisms.88  And while credit cards leave transaction records,89 electronic 
money need not.  Electronic money “is a money replacement based on encryption technologies which 
disguise the electronic information so that only the intended recipient can access its meaning.”90  
The strength of the encryption technology (and therefore the anonymity of its user) may vary, with 
the potential to be so strong that the e-money provider cannot track its own customers’ use of the 
electronic currency.91  The money-laundering applications of anonymous electronic cash are manifold.  
Since anonymous electronic money can bypass traditional financial institutions, placement would 
become easier as criminals avoided the financial transaction reporting systems used by governmental 
authorities to trace funds.92  Furthermore, anonymous electronic money would make it easier to send 
large monetary sums to poorly regulated countries and then back into the criminal’s jurisdiction, 
thereby facilitating the integration stage of money laundering.93  While the threat posed by certain 
forms of electronic money exists independently of Internet casinos, government regulation that targets 
traditional payment methods threatens to create a larger market for an attractive money-laundering 
tool.94
{23}  However, electronic money also has its drawbacks.  First, transfer fees for some forms of 
electronic money run as a high as thirty percent of the amount sent.95  Second, the lack of a clear 
market leader among the various forms of electronic money means that players may not be able to 
use the same form of electronic money provider with whom they have registered at multiple gaming 
sites.96  Third, consumers seem to lack confidence in this complex technology.97  
{24}  These drawbacks may be overcome in time; however, the dangers posed by certain forms 
of electronic money are not an argument against Internet gaming.98  The dangers are, instead, an 
argument in favor of implementing a national or international approach to address the dangers posed 
by electronic money’s anonymity.99  While federal legislation targeting illegal Internet gaming 
operations might limit some forms of money laundering, local Internet gaming regulators may also 
contribute to limiting money laundering.  Since money-laundering thrives on poor regulatory oversight 
and anonymity, a well-regulated environment with extensive record-keeping acts as a deterrent to 
potential money-launderers.  Player registration, investigations of gaming operators and employees, 
and transaction records chip away at the anonymity of online casino activity.  In addition, deposit 
and payout rules may further discourage money laundering.  Specific provisions at Lasseters Online 
include:
• ID verification procedures are used.100
• Records are maintained for when a player enters and leaves the online casino and for what 
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games were played and how much was wagered, won or lost.101  All account details, including 
deposits and withdrawals, are also preserved.102
• A gambler’s monthly deposit is initially capped at $500 when using credit cards.  Once the 
client has provided pieces of age and residence-verifying identification, the default monthly 
maximum is raised to $2,500.103  
• Credit cards can only be used to deposit funds to a player’s account.  Lasseters confirms, in real 
time, whether the cards have been reported stolen and whether sufficient funds are available.104
• Winnings are paid out in the form of checks written out to the individual whose identity and 
address have been previously verified.105
{25}  In addition, those efforts currently used to address money laundering at brick and mortar gaming 
operations might be applied to U.S.-based Internet gaming operations.106  For example, the Bank 
Secrecy Act,107 which was enacted in 1970 to combat money laundering, was extended to include 
casinos in 1985108 and strengthened through subsequent legislation.109  This framework has imposed 
detailed reporting requirements on currency transactions involving a single individual of more than 
$10,000 and has also criminalized efforts to avoid these reporting requirements.110  Reforming this and 
related legislation to apply to Internet gaming operators111 would help to create the audit trails useful to 
law enforcement agents in tracking money launderers.112  The appropriate regulations promise to make 
Internet casinos at least as unappealing to money launderers as their brick and mortar counterparts.  
C. Pathological Gambling
{26}  The Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV) classifies “pathological 
gambling” as an impulse control disorder.113  One who presents this disorder exhibits five or more of 
the following ten factors.  He/she:
(1) is preoccupied with gambling . . . ,  
(2) needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired 
excitement,
(3) has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling,
(4) is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling,
(5) gambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving a dysphoric mood . . . , 
(6) after losing money gambling, often returns another day to get even . . . ,
(7) lies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the extent of involvement 
with gambling,
(8) has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement to finance 
gambling,
(9) has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or career 
opportunity because of gambling, [or]
(10) relies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate financial situation caused 
by gambling . . . .114
{27}  In the United States, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences has 
estimated that 1.5% of adults have met the criteria for “pathological gambling” at some point in their 
lives, and 0.9 percent of the adult population has met these criteria within the past year.115  Australia’s 
Productivity Commission similarly noted that 1% of its population had “severe” gambling problems116 
(the Productivity Commission opted not to use the DSM-IV nomenclature) that included a combination 
of depression, serious suicidal thoughts, divorce, debt and poverty, and crime.117  Pathological 
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gambling is exhibited proportionately more often among young, poor, and less educated individuals,118 
although “there are few clear individual factors, other than age, that are associated with a higher 
likelihood of gambling problems.”119
{28}  Unregulated Internet gaming operations may pose greater risks for pathological gambling 
than their brick and mortar counterparts.  In particular, twenty-four hour access, the rapid pace of 
Internet games, enhanced privacy (and the possibly concomitant diminishment of social constraints), 
lower outlays on Internet games due to the fewer costs involved in setting up an online casino when 
compared to a land-based casino,120 and the lack of a “‘tangible representation of money’ such as 
betting chips for users to visualize how much they have won or lost”121 have been posited as reasons 
why Internet gambling may pose greater risks than land-based gambling for pathological gamblers.  In 
addition, Internet casino software may examine a player’s past pattern of gaming in order to create a 
more tailored and attractive gaming experience.122  Those with gambling disorders may be particularly 
attractive clients for Internet gaming sites.  Among those who gamble in the U.S., around 6% exhibit 
pathological or problem gambling;123 yet, according to the National Opinion Research Center, this 
small percentage provides 15% of the American gambling industry’s revenues.124  In a similar fashion 
in Australia, problem gamblers125 constitute 15% of gamblers, but around 33% of the Australian 
gambling industry’s market.126
{29}  However, a number of safeguards may be put in place in order to lessen the possible risks posed 
by Internet casinos to pathological gamblers.  Before discussing these safeguards, though, several 
differences between Internet and brick and mortar casinos that might mitigate pathological gamblers’ 
problems with Internet gaming sites should be addressed.  First, if Internet gaming takes place at home 
where a family resides, then household members may be more able to survey the family member 
than if the gambling occurred far from the domicile.127  Second, offline casinos often use a range of 
techniques to encourage betting -- from providing free alcohol, to pumping pleasing scents into slot 
machine pits, to the use of complex color schemes -- that would be more difficult to implement online. 
128  Brick and mortar casinos are able to compile customer data, such as a client’s average bet, time 
spent gambling, height, weight, hair color, and corrective eyewear information, that would likely 
rival anything collected online.129  Third, the fewer costs involved in the establishment and operation 
of Internet casinos, when compared to the establishment and operation of their brick and mortar 
counterparts, may create better gaming odds for Internet gamblers than for land-based gamblers.  This 
may lead, in turn, to fewer losses and/or more wins for the same duration and amount wagered in 
cyber and real space.  Finally, Australia has noted that many of its problem gamblers prefer to play 
in social settings, suggesting that, for these problem gamblers, Internet gambling is not a perfect 
substitute for land-based casinos.130 
{30}  There are several possible safeguards that Internet gaming operators could adopt to minimize 
the risks to pathological gamblers.  At Lasseters Online, clients may set bet limits on a daily, 
weekly or monthly basis and cannot subsequently raise this limit without contacting the company.131  
Furthermore, credit cards with unlimited lines of credit are not accepted for opening accounts, and 
Lasseters Online provides a link to a gambling problem counseling service and a self-excluding button 
that a gambler may press in order to take a mandatory seven day break.132  If this feature is activated 
three times, then the client is permanently excluded from the site.133  However, since a gambler’s 
ability to self-diagnose is questionable, the Australian Senate Select Committee on Information 
Technologies recommended that third parties be allowed to exclude gamblers.134   Under Queensland’s 
Interactive Gambling (Player Protection Act) enacted in 1998, “a person who satisfies the chief 
executive of a close personal interest in the welfare of the person against whom the prohibition is 
sought” may obtain the exclusion of a third party from an Internet gambling website.135  Notice of the 
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exclusion is sent to all parties concerned and to all Queensland-based Internet gaming operators.136  
Of course, in order to be effective, an exclusion policy would have to extend across the widest 
geographical region possible.      
{31}  In addition, although privacy guidelines would have to be set, an Internet gambling site might 
use its extensive records of a gamblers’ transactions in order to identify, provide information to, and 
exclude pathological gamblers.137  Other proposals by the Australian Committee included:
• Limit the speed and length of gambling activity;
• Enforce breaks (for example, every forty-five minutes);
• Restrict operation hours of online gambling operators;
• Ensure that information obtained about people’s gambling habits is not used to encourage 
irresponsible gambling habits; and
• Improve compiling of customer information, detailing the duration of gambling activity, odds 
of winning and losing, and the amounts the customer has won and lost.138
{32}  As the Australian Senate Select Committee on Information Technologies has noted, “[o]nline 
gambling makes available controls that could in fact mitigate problem gambling.  Therefore, although 
it may lead to increased gambling opportunities and accessibility, it may do so without impacting on 
problem gambling, as long as suitable regulatory controls are in place.”139
D. Underage Gambling
{33}  Younger people are reported to have higher rates of disordered gambling than their older 
counterparts,140 and the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences has estimated 
that a higher percentage of teenagers than adults are pathological gamblers.141  The vulnerability 
of adolescents and their risk-taking behavior are cited as possible reasons for these differences.142  
While casino gambling has not traditionally been popular among adolescents, relative to other types 
of gaming, such as lottery or sports pools,143 the appeal and accessibility of the Internet to youths,144 
combined with the Internet’s possibility of anonymous use, may change this dynamic.
{34}  However, according to Australia’s Productivity Commission, “[t]he motivation and capacity 
for unsupervised and regular gambling by minors on the internet is weak.”145  The financial incentive 
may be limited because if the waging is done via a parent’s credit card, then the winnings will likely 
be sent via check in the name of the cardholder or credited to the card, neither of which will enrich 
the underage gambler.146  If the gaming is done using a non-credit method, then the child, in order to 
maintain a habit and assuming no steady winning streak, must have sufficient funds at his disposal to 
feed his gambling habit.  As for the liability of the parents for their child’s gambling debts, a cardholder 
in the United States is only liable for $50 of the amount charged via unauthorized use of his or her 
credit card.147
{35}  In addition to a possibly weak financial motive for minors to engage in Internet casino gambling, 
ID verification procedures, such as those described below, would limit and deter underage access to 
casinos.  While these methods may not be one hundred percent effective in excluding minors, neither 
are the current methods by brick and mortar casinos, which are often based on physical appearance.148  
Lasseters Online requires a log-on for each session, meaning that a child whose parents gamble using 
the service would not be able to access the computer unless he knew the relevant log-on information 
(or unless the ID and password were automatically stored in the computer).  Moreover, under the 
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Northern Territory’s gaming regulation, the Internet gaming licensee must provide the customer with 
electronic access to filtering software that will prevent minors from accessing the Internet gaming 
site.149  
{36}  Another argument often cited against Internet casinos is that even if children do not win or lose 
any money, they will become more exposed to gaming that may lead to unhealthy gaming habits later 
in life.150  This increased exposure may be due to parents who use Internet casinos at home or because 
some sites offer gaming practice modules that do not require money.151  Neither of these arguments, 
though, is sufficient to justify the prohibition of regulated Internet casinos.  Gaming regulation may 
require registration in order for clients to play practice modules; however, given that countless Internet 
sites, other than Internet casinos, may offer practice versions of casino-style games, it is unlikely that 
such a regulation would deter an adolescent trying to play, for example, electronic blackjack.  And 
as for prohibiting Internet casinos because a child may be influenced to gamble later in life since 
his father or mother gambled at the home computer, it is not clear that this would influence a child 
any more than his parents talking over dinner about their gambling trip to a casino or any more than 
watching a father play poker with friends at home.152  Furthermore, although some parents may give 
their children limited permission to gamble at Internet casinos (a privilege which would be much 
more difficult to obtain in a land-based casino), “socially restrained consumption of gambling within a 
family environment, even if notionally illegal, may potentially have the benefit of teaching responsible 
gambling, as in the case of alcohol consumption.”153  
{37}  Internet gambling provides the unique combination of allowing the public to gamble from the 
comfort of home, while affording the government the opportunity to limit such gambling.  Due to the 
lack of a demonstrated connection between adolescent exposure to parental online gambling and the 
development of future gambling problems, a paternalistic and invasive policy that would limit such 
gambling is not warranted.154
E. Verifying Client Information
{38}  Many of the solutions mentioned above require Internet gaming operators to obtain and verify 
accurate client information.  Customer anonymity undermines protective measures against money-
laundering, pathological gambling, underage gambling and, more generally, the ability of states to 
determine their own gambling policies.  The importance of accurate identification technology was 
emphasized by the Nevada Assembly when, in 2001, it enacted legislation according to which:
The [gaming] commission may not adopt regulations governing the licensing 
and operation of interactive gaming until the commission first determines that …
[i]nteractive gaming systems are secure and reliable, and provide reasonable assurance 
that players will be of lawful age and communicating only from jurisdictions where it is 
lawful to make such communications.155
Similarly, under Australia’s Uniform Standards for the Regulation of Interactive Gaming:
All systems must incorporate a method to confirm identity, age and location of the 
player which complies with the legislation in the licensing jurisdiction.  This must 
include:
• players to hold an account and/or be registered by the licensed 
provider; 
• in order to open an account and be registered, players will be required 
to provide proof of identity, age and place of residence; 
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• licensed providers are to require the identification of players each time 
a player attempts to access the site, using such methods as a personal 
identification number or password and challenge questions.156
We may use, once again, Lasseters Online as an example.  In order to withdraw money from a casino 
account within ninety days of registration,157 Lasseters Online requires a copy (which may be a faxed 
or a scanned copy) of a valid passport, drivers license, birth certificate or “Age identification card” 
in order to prove that the player is not a minor.158  In addition, the company requires a “rent receipt,” 
electricity, telephone, gas, water bill, “or other” document as proof of address. 159  Internet casinos 
might also use third party identity, age, and residence verifiers;160 however, these verifiers’ methods 
may require credit card information that will obviously not be available if the gambler does not use a 
credit card.    
{39}  Payment methods may offer another means of providing a better indication of at least one aspect 
of a customer’s identificatio, namely his physical location.  For example, Finland required players of 
an online national lottery to have accounts with Finnish financial institutions.161  Another possibility is 
for Internet gaming operators to sell stored-value cards (or “smart cards”) at stores located within the 
state (for example, at locations where lottery tickets are sold) that could be used to gamble at online, 
intrastate casinos.  In fact, the state may have an interest in ensuring that these cards are the only 
permissible payment methods used at online casinos.  If a Nevada resident wants to gamble at a casino 
located within the state of Nevada, he would have to buy a card from a nearby store with a prefixed 
amount of cash on it.  He would then use this card to deposit funds into his Internet casino account.  
While this method would not prevent a Utah resident from crossing the border to buy a Nevada 
state card that he could use at his Utah residence or a Maine resident, on his vacation to Utah, from 
stocking up on Nevada state cards, these cards, in combination with other sources used for proof of 
identification and residence, might provide a reliable portrait of a client.
{40}  As technology develops, so may the capacity to ensure the accuracy of client information.  
Internet casinos may one day require digital certificates, which Larry Lessig has described as: 
[E]ncrypted digital objects that make it possible for the holder of the certificate to make 
credible assertions about himself . . . .  Such a certificate could reside on the owner’s 
machine, and as he or she tries to enter a given site, the server could automatically 
check whether the person entering has the proper papers.  Such certificates would 
function as a kind of digital passport which, once acquired, would function invisibly 
behind the screen, as it were.162
Another possible identity verification scheme, although vulnerable to a variety of circumvention 
techniques, would match Internet Protocol addresses against geographical databases in an effort to 
locate the physical location of IP address.163
{41}  The determined and technological-savvy gambler will not be thwarted by client verification 
procedures.  Nor, however, is the determined sixteen-year-old person likely to be thwarted in his efforts 
to illegally purchase alcohol or a pack of cigarettes.  The question is not whether the currently available 
verification methods for Internet gamblers would be one hundred percent effective.  Rather, one should 
ask whether these verification procedures will increase transaction costs for most Internet gamblers to 
the point where these procedures will deter most Internet gamblers from accessing out-of-state Internet 
casinos. 164  While future technology may make client identification more reliable, existing methods 
seem sufficient to make Internet gambling for out-of-state residents unappealing to all but the most 
determined gamblers.  
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IV. CURRENT FEDERAL LAW AS APPLIED TO INTERNET GAMBLING DOES NOT CONFORM TO PAST 
FEDERAL GAMBLING REGULATORY TRENDS
{42}  Part II of this paper attempted to discern guidelines underlying federal treatment of gambling.  
Part III then demonstrated that regulated Internet casinos need not be more dangerous than regulated 
offline casinos, thereby supporting the argument that the federal trends towards gambling need 
not be altered for online gaming activity.  Yet, to what extent are online casinos capable of being 
regulated?  Much of the federal gambling legislation discussed in Part II, such as the Wire, Wagering 
Paraphernalia and Travel Acts, were enacted to support state policy and therefore premised on the 
assumption that effective gambling regulation sometimes surpasses the states’ abilities.  To the extent, 
therefore, that the federal gambling policy designed to support the states and to limit large-scale 
gambling enterprises is weakened, the states’ regulatory framework also becomes less effective.  The 
next step is to combine Parts II and III and to inquire whether the current federal approach towards 
online gaming is, in practice, consistent with the federal gambling framework.
{43}  Since federal gaming policy often defers to state legislatures, one may first inquire how states 
have responded to Internet gaming.  As mentioned above,165 most Internet gambling is, in theory, 
illegal in every state.  Some states have enacted statutes explicitly targeting Internet gambling,166 while 
in other states, Internet gambling may also run afoul of general gambling state statutes.167  Yet while 
state attorneys general have not hesitated to pursue Internet gambling operators,168 a consensus is 
emerging that expanded federal legislation is necessary to address what Connecticut’s state attorney 
general has called “the sordid, despicable nature of an unregulated, faceless, nameless Internet 
gambling industry.”169  The National Association of Attorney Generals, whose members include the 
chief legal officers of all U.S. states, commonwealths, and territories and which is not an association 
that is often characterized as a strong advocate of increased federal intervention, has called upon 
the federal government to expand its regulatory powers over Internet gambling.170  Furthermore, a 
Congressionally-mandated commission, noting that “it is difficult for states to adequately monitor and 
regulate such gambling,” advocated a federal prohibition on Internet gambling not already authorized 
in the United States.171  
{44}  In light of the recognition that the problems of Internet gambling may surpass states’ regulatory 
abilities, one might ask whether, with respect to Internet gambling, the federal government is 
fulfilling its traditional role of supporting state gambling policy and of limiting the growth of large-
scale gambling operations (ostensibly in order to limit crime).  One particular concern is the foreign 
Internet gambling operation because it represents a significant portion of current Internet gambling 
transactions172 and raises jurisdictional and enforcement problems.  In order to determine whether 
the federal regulatory framework for Internet gambling is consistent with the trends discussed in 
the previous sections, the following analysis examines how courts might assert subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident Internet gambling operation under existing federal gambling 
law and what enforcement tools are currently available.
A. Establishing Subject Matter Jurisdiction
{45}  In a diversity case, a court must determine whether the law of the forum state is applicable to the 
nonresident defendant in order to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.173  As noted in 
Part II, there are an assortment of federal gaming laws; however, many of these laws apply imperfectly 
to Internet gaming due to changes in technology.  Foremost among these laws is the Wire Act.174  
The Wire Act was a federal response to the increasing use of telephones and other communications 
facilities by illegal bookmaking operations.175  This Act prohibits the use of:
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a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of 
bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting 
event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the 
recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information 
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers . . . .176
The Wire Act enables federal, state, or local law enforcement agents to enjoin communications 
facilities subject to the Federal Communications Commission’s jurisdiction from providing service to 
those who violate the Act.177 
{46}  Although the Wire Act, enacted long before the explosion of the World Wide Web, is the federal 
act most often applied in efforts to prosecute Internet gambling,178 ambiguity surrounds the Wire Act’s 
applicability to many forms of online gaming.  Most notably, the extent of the Act’s targeted gambling 
activities is unclear.  Although this Act focuses on “the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event 
or contest,” it never defines either “sporting event” or “contest.”179  Furthermore, it is unclear whether 
the adjective “sporting” is intended to modify both “event,” as well as “contest.”180  While the Wire 
Act has been applied to baseball, football,181 and horse races,182 it is questionable whether it applies 
to online casino games.183  Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s explanation of the Wire Act focused 
almost exclusively on “sporting events,”184 probably because the possibility of running a casino via 
wires was unimaginable until the recent past.  Although a New York state court applied the Wire 
Act to an Antigua-based Internet casino accessible to New York residents185 and although the U.S. 
Department of Justice does not consider the Wire Act limited to sports-related gambling activities,186 a 
federal district court in In re MasterCard International Inc.187 stated that “internet gambling on a game 
of chance is not prohibited conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 1084.”188  The court’s view was that “the Wire 
Act does not prohibit internet casino gambling.”189  The federal court noted the legislative history of 
the Wire Act190 and the more recent Congressional efforts to amend the Wire Act to include games of 
chance as support for its position.191
{47}  Even if one were to accept the interpretation that the Wire Act applies to most forms of Internet 
gaming, this relevance may be of limited duration as the Act is currently formulated.  Integral to the 
Act’s definition of “wire communication” is “wire, cable, or other like connection between the points 
of origin and reception of such transmission.”192  With the advent of wireless Internet connections, 
Internet gaming operators will be able to bypass “wire communication” all together.193
{48}  Nonetheless, some commentators believe that, even with the advent of wireless technology, the 
Wire Act may still be applicable to Internet gaming.  As noted above, the statute’s definition of “wire 
communication” refers to “wire, cable, or other like connection.”194   Consequently, even if the signal’s 
voyage is completely wireless, the Wire Act’s reference to “other like connection” could be applied 
to new technologies.195  However, it might stretch the bounds of credibility to argue that a “wire 
communication facility” may include a “wireless communication facility.”
{49}  Yet as long as the communication signal traverses a wire at some point on its journey from the 
sender to the receiver, the Wire Act becomes applicable,196 and this process may apply to the Internet 
connection, as well as to subsequent transactions.  For example, in Cheyenne Sales, Ltd. v. Western 
Union Financial Services Intern,197 the Wire Act was used to justify the termination of wire transfer 
services from clients in the United States to an offshore gambling business.  The court stated that 
“state and federal courts across the country have upheld a carrier’s termination of wire service upon 
notice from either a state or federal law enforcement official that a customer is using the service in 
furtherance of illegal gambling operations.”198   Although Cheyenne Sales did not involve an Internet 
gaming operation, it demonstrates the possible legal vulnerability of Internet gaming businesses that 
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use wire-based facilities at some point in their transactions with clients.
{50}  In sum, evolving technologies have lessened the Wire Act’s efficacy.  While it may have 
been difficult in the 1960’s to imagine a casino operating via a “wire communications facility,” and 
Congress may therefore have focused on sports betting, the Internet has offered expanded gambling 
opportunities.  In addition, while satellite technology was not an everyday communications reality in 
the 1960’s, it is today.  Despite these limitations, the Wire Act can currently be used against a variety 
of online sports betting sites.
{51}  Complications also surround the applicability of another federal gambling law, the Interstate 
Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act (“Paraphernalia Act”), to Internet gaming.199  The 
Paraphernalia Act prohibits everyone, except for “common carriers in the usual course of business,” 
from knowingly carrying or sending “in interstate or foreign commerce any record, paraphernalia, 
ticket, certificate, bills, slip, token, paper, writing, or other device used, or to be used, or adapted, 
devised, or designed for use in” a variety of gambling related activities.200  In World Interactive 
Gaming Corp., a gambling operation’s sending of promotional materials through the United States’ 
mail and purchase of computers through the United States’ mail for use in its Antigua-based Internet 
casino were found to violate the Paraphernalia Act.201  However, even though the Act’s purpose was 
broadly characterized as “to cut off and shut off gambling supplies,”202 and even though in United 
States v. Mendelsohn,203 a Ninth Circuit Court favored a broad interpretation of the word “device”204 
and held that a computer disk containing a sports bookmaking program fell under the definition,205 
it is unclear whether an intangible website or gaming software downloaded from a website 
would qualify as an “other device” under the Paraphernalia Act.206  In Pic-A-State Pennsylvania, 
Inc. v. Pennsylvania,207 a United States district court in Pennsylvania noted that the Wire and 
Paraphernalia Acts were enacted on the same day, and that while the former specifically refers to wire 
communications, the latter does not.  The court consequently concluded that the Paraphernalia Act 
applied only to tangible objects and not to computer communications.208
{52}  Other federal acts, such as the Travel and Illegal Gambling Business Acts, although largely 
untested in courts, may be readily applied to Internet gaming.  The Travel Act was designed to 
“suppress . . . unlawful local activities from which organized crime drew its sustenance.”209  The 
provisions that are possibly relevant to Internet gaming sanction the use of “any facility in interstate 
or foreign commerce” to conduct “any business enterprise involving gambling” that is forbidden by 
state or federal laws.210  The Travel Act may therefore cover a wider range of gambling activities than 
the Wire Act with its likely limitation to sports gambling.211  The Travel Act has been used to prosecute 
illegal brick and mortar casinos,212 as well as betting via the telephone.213  In addition, “facility in 
interstate or foreign commerce” could apply to the Internet.214  Furthermore, in World Interactive 
Gaming Corp., a New York state trial court held that the Travel Act could be used against a Delaware 
corporation’s Antigua-licensed casino that provided gaming opportunities via the Internet to New York 
residents.215  In particular, the court noted, “[b]y hosting this [virtual] casino and exchanging betting 
information with the user, an illegal communication in violation of the Wire Act and the Travel Act has 
occurred.”216
{53}  The Illegal Gambling Businesses Act makes it illegal to conduct any gambling business that:
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted; 
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, 
or own all or part of such business; and (iii) has been or remains in substantially 
continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of 
$2,000 in any single day.217
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While section 1955 has yet to be successfully used to prosecute an Internet gaming operation, its 
minimal requirements may make it a likely candidate for future use.  Offering a website for more 
than thirty days may satisfy the third requirement, and it is possible that the “five or more persons” 
in the second requirement might include computer support staff.218  Furthermore, in contrast to the 
other statutes, section 1955 reaches purely intrastate gambling activities.219  However, since the Illegal 
Gambling Business Act is predicated on a violation of state or local law, it can be no more effective 
than the underlying state or local statutes upon which it is based.220
{54}  Finally, the 1970 Crime Control Act, which introduced the Illegal Gambling Businesses Act,221 
also included the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which was designed 
to combat “the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating 
in interstate commerce.”222  RICO targets those who have been linked to “a pattern of racketeering 
activity”223 in association with a number of other prohibited forms of conduct.224  Racketeering activity 
is defined to include “any act or threat involving . . . gambling . . . which is chargeable under State law 
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.”225  Racketeering activity may also include 
any act indictable under the Wire Act, the Travel Act, the Paraphernalia Act, or the Illegal Gambling 
Businesses Act.226  Although RICO differs from the previous gambling legislation because it offers 
civil causes of action in addition to criminal sanctions, 227 the Act’s complexity may lead state or 
federal prosecutors to favor the previously mentioned gambling statutes.228  Moreover, the use of RICO 
to target third parties, such as credit card companies or issuing banks whose cards are used at online 
gaming sites, has, so far, been unsuccessful.229
{55}  As the above discussion of various federal statutes suggests, there are a number of laws that 
might apply to Internet gaming operations (even though certain ones may need to be updated in order 
to account for changes in technology); however, before a court may conclude that subject matter 
jurisdiction is appropriate over a nonresident defendant, it must also consider whether Congress 
intended to reach beyond U.S. borders in the application of a particular piece of legislation.  It has 
long been established that Congress may, under the Commerce Clause, forbid the transfer of gaming-
related instruments beyond the boundaries of a state,230 and it is likely that Congress also has the 
extraterritorial power to regulate Internet gaming.231  However, although Congress may exercise this 
extraterritorial power, it does not mean that Congress has done so in all gambling-related legislation.232  
While some Congressional legislation provides an explicit reference or clear legislative intent to target 
individuals beyond U.S. borders,233 the federal, gambling-related legislation is not as clear. 234  However 
at least two courts have stated that the reference to “foreign commerce” in the Wire Act235 gives courts 
extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign-based Internet gambling operator.236
{56}  If no explicit statutory reference or clear legislative intent is found in gambling-related 
legislation, one must apply the “effects test” as first outlined in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America (ALCOA) in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.237  
According to the court’s decision, subject matter jurisdiction may be found when a nonresident 
defendant’s activity intends to affect and does affect the U.S. domestic market.238  While a conflict 
between U.S. and domestic law is given substantial weight in the court’s analysis of whether subject 
matter jurisdiction can be exercised, this conflict is but one factor among several that the court should 
consider in deciding whether to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.239  The fact that conduct is legal 
and even strongly encouraged in a foreign state will not necessarily prevent the application of U.S. 
law.240  A foreign enterprise’s express purpose to affect U.S. commerce and the “substantial nature of 
the effect produced” may justify the exercise of U.S. subject matter jurisdiction.241  Given unregulated 
Internet gaming’s social consequences,242 possible negative economic impacts on brick and mortar 
casinos,243 and possible erosion of state tax revenues,244 subject matter jurisdiction should generally be 
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found over a non-resident Internet gaming operation.245  
{57}  In order to evade subject matter jurisdiction, online gaming operations have argued that the 
targeted gambling activities occurred abroad and in compliance with the laws of a foreign country.   
The Internet gaming, so the argument goes, was therefore not subject to U.S. federal and state laws.246  
However, this argument is unlikely to be successful where there is evidence of a specific illegal 
transaction between a U.S. resident and an Internet gaming operator.247  For example, in People v. 
World Interactive Gaming Corp., gamblers in New York wired money to an Antiguan bank account 
in order to play at an online, Antiguan-licensed casino.248  In making its decision, the district court 
referred to New York Penal Law under which gambling is considered to take place in New York if 
the gambler is located in New York.249  The court concluded that bets transmitted from New York to 
Antigua (where the gambling at issue was legal) via the Internet constituted gambling activity within 
the State of New York.250  The court considered the virtual casino to be located within the user’s 
computer;251 therefore, New York courts had subject matter jurisdiction, and the State of New York’s 
gambling prohibitions, in addition to the provisions of the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Wagering 
Paraphernalia Act, were pertinent.252  
{58}  Regardless of whether courts hold that the proscribed casino activity takes place on the resident 
gambler’s computer or whether the prohibited activity is found to take place abroad and an “effects 
and conflicts of law” analysis is therefore required, courts will likely assert subject matter jurisdiction 
over Internet gaming operations wherever they may be. 
B. Establishing Personal Jurisdiction
{59}  If the law of the forum state is applicable to the nonresident, then the second part of the 
jurisdiction analysis verifies whether the granting of jurisdiction under the forum’s law would satisfy 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.253  The Due Process Clause’s constitutional 
protections extend to foreign defendants who are asked to appear in U.S. courts.254  This second 
constitutional analysis involves, in turn, a multi-step analysis of its own.255  
{60}  It is first necessary to examine the relationship between the defendant and the forum.  General 
jurisdiction over the defendant may be established if there are “systematic and continuous” activities 
by the defendant in the forum state, regardless of whether the cause of action’s subject matter has any 
connection to the forum state. 256  In the absence of these systematic and continuous activities by the 
defendant in the forum state, the link between the defendant and the forum may be established under 
specific jurisdiction when “the plaintiff’s claim is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contact 
with the forum.”257 
{61}  Regardless of whether general or specific jurisdiction is asserted, the defendant must have 
established minimum contacts within the state by purposefully availing itself of “the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”258  
Examples of such minimum contacts include “designing the product for the market in the forum State, 
advertising in the forum State, [and] establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in 
the forum State . . . .”259  
{62}  Throughout the second part of this analysis, an overarching concern is whether exercising 
jurisdiction over the nonresident would offend traditional notions of “fair play and substantial 
justice.”260  The defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State must be such “that he could 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”261  Others factors to be considered in the imprecise-
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sounding calculus of “fair play and substantial justice” include “‘the burden on the defendant,’ ‘the 
forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and 
effective relief,’ ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies,’ and the ‘shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies.’”262  For nonresidents defendants in particular, a court may look at “[t]he unique 
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system” and give those burdens 
“significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction 
over national borders.”263   
{63}  In the context of an Internet transaction, courts have determined personal jurisdiction according 
to a “sliding scale” by which “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised 
is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over 
the Internet.”264  In Zippo Manufacturing, the district court described this sliding scale in the following 
terms:
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business 
over the Internet.  If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign 
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over 
the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper.  At the opposite end are situations where 
a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible 
to users in foreign jurisdictions.  A passive Web site that does little more than make 
information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise 
personal jurisdiction.  The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a 
user can exchange information with the host computer.  In these cases, the exercise of 
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature 
of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.265
Subsequent case law has suggested that companies whose websites offer lists of products sold, online 
sales, ordering information, file downloads, and links to other websites are not considered “passive 
websites.”266
{64}  Internet gambling sites seem to fall into either the “clearly doing business” or “middle ground” 
categories.  For example, in State v. Granite Gate Resorts Inc.,267 a Minnesota court found personal 
jurisdiction over a Nevada Internet gambling corporation, although it did not yet accept bets.  
Jurisdiction was founded on the grounds that the site advertised on a Nevada tourist information web 
page,268 maintained an online mailing list to keep potential customers updated on its forthcoming 
launch of services,269 and displayed online a toll-free number for customer inquiries270 and a declaration 
that the company reserved the right to sue the customer in his or her home state for breach of 
contract.271   Minimum contacts have also been found when a fully functioning online casino advertised 
over the Internet, required its customers to enter into contracts before playing games, and subsequently 
sent prizes via regular mail to the customers’ residences.272
{65}  Furthermore, an Internet casino’s efforts to deny gambling access to residents in a jurisdiction 
where the gambling at issue is illegal will not be considered proof that the defendant did not knowingly 
do business in that jurisdiction if the gambler can easily circumvent the casino’s safeguard measures.273  
For example, in People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp.,274 users were required to enter their 
physical address, and access was denied for jurisdictions where land-based gambling was illegal; 
however, a gambler in a jurisdiction where land-based gambling was illegal only had to change his 
or her address to a jurisdiction where land-based gambling was legal in order to access the Internet 
gambling.275  Given the casino’s easily fooled jurisdiction-identification system, the court decided that 
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the Internet casino could not defend itself by claiming that it had unknowingly accepted bets from 
residents in New York, where unauthorized land-based gambling was illegal.276 
  
{66}  The forum State’s interest in limiting fraud or prohibiting gambling has been cited as a 
substantive social policy justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction (even if this interest is not, 
on its own, determinative).  In Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc.,277 in which a Texas gambler sued an 
Internet casino for allegedly refusing to pay winnings, the court, in finding personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant, noted that:
Texas clearly has a strong interest in protecting its citizens by adjudicating disputes 
involving the alleged breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Texas Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act by an Internet casino on Texas residents.  Furthermore, due regard 
must be given to the Plaintiff’s choice to seek relief in Texas.  These concerns outweigh 
the burden created by requiring the Defendant to defend the suit in Texas.278
Similar language in other Internet gambling cases suggests a strong interest in finding jurisdiction over 
a nonresident Internet operator.279  It therefore seems that most nonresident Internet gaming operations 
will have established sufficient minimum contacts with the jurisdiction to justify a court’s assertion of 
personal jurisdiction.
C. Enforcement
{67}  A law’s actual scope depends upon a nation’s ability to enforce that law.280  Even if jurisdiction 
can be established over a defendant and even though Congress has been willing to sanction a wide 
range of individuals—from “high level bosses” to “street level employees”281 who have knowingly 
affiliated themselves with a gambling business282--enforcement of a decision against a non-resident 
with no presence beyond a website in the United States poses significant problems.   Enforcement 
measures under the current federal gambling legislation include fines, forfeiture of assets, 
imprisonment, and/or the enjoining of FCC-regulated communications centers.283  Yet, with the 
exception of the last measure (and even the Wire Act has only been used against American citizens),284 
these penalties may not deter a foreign Internet gaming operator with limited ties to the United States 
from seeking the business of America’s Internet gamblers.  An arrest warrant issued by an American 
court may prevent the owner of a foreign Internet gaming business from visiting the United States or 
those countries whose extradition treaties and gambling laws might pose a risk for him,285 yet many 
individuals may conclude that the economic benefits of the business outweigh its risks.     
{68}  Part of this enforcement problem is due to the underlying architecture of the Internet.  As noted 
in Part II, Congress has, in the past, recruited large communications networks in its efforts to combat 
illegal gambling, including the postal and telephone systems.  One can add radio and television to that 
list. 286  Although these technologies’ architectures have significantly changed in the past few years, 
their design at the time at which the relevant statutes were enacted and for subsequent decades was a 
far cry from Internet architecture.  First, the postal, radio, television, and telephone systems distributed 
intelligence within the network.  Postal service inspectors, telephone companies, and broadcasters 
could analyze the types of messages sent and could then discriminate against certain types of content 
or usage patterns.  “One could design telephone networks to report with each call who was called, 
where that person lives, how long the call lasted, and from which line it was made.  Indeed, this is 
how telephone networks today are designed.”287  Second, these systems were oriented towards focal 
points, whether these were specific transmitters, central switches,288 or sorting facilities.  Third, the 
flow of information through these systems generally followed predictable paths.  A letter sent from one 
specific destination to another via the U.S. Postal Service follows a limited number of well-defined 
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routes.  One used to be able to say the same for telephone calls, television, and radio transmissions. 
Taken together, these system characteristics enabled law enforcement officials to place pressure on 
points of control or communication pathways in order to enforce content-based regulations.   
{69}  In contrast to this architecture: 
• Τhe Internet ideally pushes intelligence to the edge of the network so that “the network 
simply moves the data and leaves the interpretation of the data to the applications at 
either end.”289  IP protocols do not reveal “who sent the data, from where the data were 
sent, to where (geographically) the data are going, for what purpose the data are going 
there, or what kind of data they are.”290 
• Τhe Internet is less oriented towards focal points, and individual users can therefore 
more easily bypass gatekeepers.291  
• Τhe Internet breaks its messages into packets which are “spewed across the system . . . 
.  [N]othing ensures that they will travel in the same way, or along the same path.   They 
take the most efficient path, which depends on the demand at any one time.”292
Given these characteristics, it is not surprising that the “the Net’s architecture has prominently 
stymied control efforts.”293  While existing federal law, subject to minor modifications, supports state 
Internet gambling policies to the extent that federal law is largely sufficient to establish personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign Internet gaming operations, the lack of enforcement abilities 
over nonresident defendants with few ties to the United States lessens the deterrence value of these 
judgments.294  
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR ENFORCING FEDERAL GAMBLING LEGISLATION
AGAINST INTERNET GAMBLING OPERATORS
{70}  Given the distributed nature of the Internet and the off-shore locations of possible defendants, 
attention is often focused on third parties affiliated with Internet gambling businesses.  In order to 
address the inaccessibility of off-shore Internet gaming operators, the House of Representatives and 
Senate have proposed at least fifteen bills that have directly addressed Internet gambling since 1995, 
although none have been successful.295  This paper now turns to common suggestions for undermining 
Internet gambling operators: penalizing individual gamblers, blocking Internet Protocol (IP) addresses 
via Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and targeting payment providers.
A. Penalizing Gamblers
{71}  Sanctions against individual gamblers were proposed in earlier pieces of Congressional 
Internet gambling legislation.  As part of the 1995 Crime Prevention Act, Senator Jon Kyl included 
an amendment to the Wire Act so that “individuals who gamble or wager via wire or electronic 
communication are penalized -- not just those who are in the business of gambling.”296  Similarly, 
under the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997, the Wire Act would have been expanded to 
encompass
[w]hoever . . . knowingly uses a communication facility for the transmission or receipt 
in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers, information assisting in the placing 
of bets or wagers, or a communication that entitles the transmitter or receiver to the 
opportunity to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers.297
{72}  This effort to penalize individual gambling customers was inconsistent with past federal 
gambling statutes.298  The Wire Act applies to those “engaged in the business of betting or wagering,”299 
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and it does not apply to individual gamblers, regardless of the size or frequency of their bets.300  
Although the language of The Travel Act seems broad enough to cover individuals,301 the Fifth Circuit 
held in United States v. Roberson302 that “[t]he purpose of the [Travel] Act is clear: It aims to deny 
those engaged in criminal business enterprise access to channels of interstate commerce. It is not aimed 
at individual substantive offenses.”303  While the Wagering Paraphernalia Act applies to “[w]hoever, 
except a common carrier in the usual course of its business” sends gambling-related material in 
foreign or interstate commerce, the Act has, in practice, been applied to gambling businesses instead of 
individual gamblers.304  As for the Illegal Gambling Business Act, it sanctions, as its title suggests, an 
“illegal gambling business.”305
{73}  Although one might argue that the difficulty of enforcing judgments against Internet gambling 
operators justifies sanctioning Internet gamblers, prosecuting Internet gamblers may, in fact, be no 
more feasible or effective than targeting Internet gaming operators.  According to the U.S. Department 
of Justice, legislation targeting bettors would divert resources that could better be spent on large 
operations, and an over-broad law would result in inconsistent enforcement.306  G. Robert Blakey 
and Harold Kurland offer a different argument against federal legislation that focuses on individual 
gamblers: “Only in prosecuting large-scale gambling operations does the federal government possess 
a significant enforcement advantage . . . .  Regulation of the individual bettor should remain a matter 
of state law; no justification appears for deviating from the federal practice of noninterference with 
state policies.”307  Fortunately, the effort to target Internet gamblers has not appeared in bills proposed 
subsequent to 1997.
B. ISPs
{74}  Under the Wire Act, common carriers, upon law enforcement’s request, are required to refuse or 
to terminate the service of those transmitting illegal gambling information.308  Many of the proposed 
Congressional bills, regardless of whether they modify the Wire Act or whether they propose new 
sections to the U.S. Code, follow this same approach on the Internet.309  An ISP would have an 
obligation, upon having received specific instructions from law enforcement agencies regarding a 
particular site, to discontinue or to refuse access to the designated site (presumably by blocking the IP 
address).310  Failure on the part of the ISP to act would place the ISP in violation of, for example, the 
proposed Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act.311
{75}  However, there are several problems with updating the Wire Act in order to force ISPs to 
block IP addresses.  First, several websites may share the same IP address, with one researcher 
estimating that approximately 87% of active .com, .net and, .org web sites use shared IP 
addresses.312   Consequently, while an unlawful Internet casino whose IP address is blocked 
may not be able to invoke First Amendment rights,313 a site that is the victim of over-inclusive 
Internet blocking may.314  Second, since a site’s URL and IP address are distinct, an Internet 
gambling operator could change IP addresses without changing its URL.  Its clients need never 
know that their favorite gambling site has changed IP addresses because they would still type 
the same address into their browser.  Of course, an enforcement system, in order to be effective, 
need not be perfect.315  For example, a gambler who connects to an offshore ISP in order to 
access a gambling site will have to pay a long-distance rate, and an Internet gambling site whose 
IP address has been blocked will have to spend time and money to find another one if it wants 
to continue to service American customers.  However, given the significant profits to be gained 
from servicing Americans’ appetite for Internet gambling, the costs associated with IP blocking 
do not seem likely to encourage compliance with Internet gambling regulations.
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{76}  A third concern is often raised with respect to state-based ISP regulations.  If all states 
forbade Internet gambling (and had comparable definitions of “Internet gambling”), then 
Nevada would not object if Utah enjoined an ISP to block the IP address of an Australian 
Internet gambling site, even if that ISP also served Nevada residents.  Utah would, in fact, be 
helping Nevada to enforce its anti-Internet gambling policy.  However, what would happen 
if Nevada legalized Internet gambling?  Utah’s law enforcement actions would then seem 
like unwelcome intrusions into Nevada and potential violations of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.316
{77}  There is a vision of ISPs as “Internet police, not only cordoning off areas from view 
when acting as hosts of content, but also more broadly restricting access to particular net-
worked entities with whom their customers wish to communicate -- thus determining what 
those customers can see, wherever it might be online.”317  For better or for worse, that day has 
not yet come.  Absent more accurate technology,318 IP blocking is constitutionally dubious and 
of questionable efficacy regardless of whether it is instituted at the state or federal level.  
{78}  Even setting aside the problems with IP blocking, there is a strong argument that the Wire 
Act needs to be reexamined.  The extent to which the Wire Act manifests federal disregard for state 
gambling policy makes it a rarity among federal gambling statutes.  The Illegal Gambling Business 
Act is predicated upon a “violation of the law of the State or political subdivision in which it is 
conducted;”319 the Travel Act applies to a gambling enterprise “in violation of the laws of the State in 
which they are committed or of the United States;”320 the Johnson Act, which, as discussed in Part II, 
regulates the interstate transport of certain gambling devices, has an exception for jurisdictions that 
have legalized the equipment at issue;321 and the Wagering Paraphernalia Act provides an exception for 
“the transportation of betting materials to be used in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event 
into a State in which such betting is legal under the statutes of that State.”322  However, the Wire Act 
forbids interstate wagering, even when the wager is to and from a jurisdiction where the gambling at 
issue is legal.323  It is difficult to argue, as is generally done with respect to federal gambling policy, that 
the Wire Act “prevent[s] interference by one State with the gambling policies of another”324 when both 
states have legalized the gambling at issue.  Instead, the rationale may be one that was put forth by 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals when it wrote that the Wire Act was “part of an independent federal 
policy aimed at those who would, in furtherance of any gambling activity, employ any means within 
direct federal control.” 325  Similarly, a Justice Department employee, in his testimony before a House 
committee in 1950, referred to “a Nationwide policy against gambling, particularly commercialized 
gambling.”326
{79}  The idea of a nationwide federal policy against gambling, regardless of whether it is sanctioned 
by the states in which it takes place, is at odds with the traditional deference to state legislatures.  
Although one might argue that this policy is perfectly consistent with the targeting of large-scale 
gaming operations in the interest of fighting crime, 327 this connection between legalized gambling and 
crime is highly debatable.328  Moreover, it is unclear why a federal statute that required the underlying 
interstate activity to be illegal in at least one of the jurisdictions would undermine crime-fighting 
measures.  Currently, an Internet gambling business in full compliance with its jurisdiction’s laws that 
offered its services to a client in another jurisdiction in which Internet gambling was legal might be 
subject to sanctions under the Wire Act.  Although this had been true since the 1960’s with respect 
to telephone gambling, it is not clear that the original rationale for the Wire Act -- to combat mafia-
infiltrated bookmakers329 -- is still valid several decades later with respect to either telephone gambling 
or a potentially heavily regulated on-line gambling industry.
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{80}  To the extent that the Wire Act is still useful in combating large-scale, illegal gambling 
operations conducted via certain communications facilities, Congress might keep the act but extend 
the Wire Act’s safe harbor provisions330 to include the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce 
of bets from a state or foreign country where the betting at issue is legal into a state or foreign 
country in which that betting is also legal.  There are several reasons for doing so.  First, permitting 
the transmission of “information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers,” as provided in the Wire 
Act’s safe harbor provision,331 but not the transmission of “bets or wagers” is a tenuous distinction.  
The exemption for “information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers” was originally designed 
with horseracing betting in mind,332 and that industry has subsequently gained the opportunity to 
accept interstate wagers under certain conditions.333  Second, while it was relatively easy to determine 
whether a wager via telephone was interstate by simply determining the location of the caller and the 
person being called, it is more difficult to determine the precise location of a single Internet gambling 
operator that may be incorporated in one state and use a server in another location.   If liberally 
construed or broadly reworded, the Wire Act might constitute a ban on Internet gambling, regardless 
of individual state policies.  Finally, limiting the Wire Act’s applicability would accord greater respect 
to foreign jurisdictions and prevent accusations of international trade agreement violations against 
the United States, such as that recently leveled by Antigua and Barbuda before the World Trade 
Organization.334
{81}  By extending the Wire Act’s safe harbor to include interstate wagers from and to jurisdictions 
in which the wagers are legal, the federal government would be able to continue to fight against a 
wide range of gambling targets while showing greater respect to state policies.  Although the Wire Act 
would be of limited use against Internet gambling operators, an expanded safe harbor provision might 
be relevant in the event that IP blocking becomes more technologically accurate.
C. Payment Providers
{82}  In the past, states have attacked illegal gambling by undermining its payment channels.  One 
way of doing this has been through contract law.  In particular, loans for gambling are not enforceable 
in most states under state statutes or under general public policy.335   Consequently, casinos have 
had difficulty recovering money from gamblers even in jurisdictions where the gambling at issue 
is legal.336  However, if the lender did not know that the loan was to be used for an illegal purpose, 
then the debt may be enforceable.337  This rationale has been used to find that bettors were liable for 
cash advances from their credit card companies because the latter were not knowing participants in 
the bettors’ gambling.338  Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that there are no hard and fast rules 
regarding the enforceability of gambling debts.  The analysis is highly fact-specific,339 and this creates 
an uncertain legal environment for casinos and payment providers, both off and on the Internet. 
{83}  This contractual approach has met with mixed success in addressing Internet casino gambling.  
Since credit cards have been the most frequently used payment method for Internet gambling, cases 
regarding the enforceability of Internet gambling debt have focused on them. 340  For example, a 
California resident who had been sued by credit card companies for over $70,000 in Internet gambling 
expenses spread out over twelve cards argued that her debt was unenforceable because the gambling 
merchants, whose operations were alleged to be illegal under California law, should never have been 
given merchant accounts.341  The suit settled out of court,342 and several banks have subsequently 
limited the Internet gambling transactions permitted on their cards.343
{84}  Online gamblers seeking to avoid their credit card debts have used civil suits under RICO,344 
but these gamblers have had less success than the aforementioned California plaintiff.  One judge 
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described these online gamblers as “independent actors who made a knowing and voluntary choice to 
engage in a course of conduct.  Litigation over their own actions arose only when the result of those 
actions became a debt that they did not wish to pay.”345  Furthermore, in Jubelirer v. MasterCard 
Intermational, Inc., the judge emphasized the distant relationship between the credit card company and 
its “more than 10 million merchants.”346  Such a characterization may make it difficult for courts to 
hold that credit card companies had knowledge of a client’s specific gambling expenditures.347
{85}  Establishing that the debt at issue involves a contract that is separate from the gambling activity 
“may serve to rebut arguments that it is illegal, void, or unenforceable.”348  In other words, the more 
distance that the credit card company can place between its extension of credit to the customer and the 
customer’s charges to the Internet gambling operation, the better the chances that the credit card loan 
will be enforceable.  Credit card transactions may involve multiple contracts between, for example, 
credit organizations, issuing banks, merchant banks, the gambler, and the casino, each of which may 
be located in a different jurisdiction.349  Without delving into the details of the credit card hierarchy, 
the issuing bank is often the primary party affected when gamblers contest their suits, although the 
merchant bank has the closest connection to the gambling operator.350  When one also considers that 
Internet casinos may deceive credit card companies regarding the nature of their transactions351 and that 
intermediate electronic accounts that are established using credit cards can be used to purchase a range 
of products and services (gambling being one among many),352 it may not be difficult for the issuing 
bank or other parties in the credit hierarchy to argue for the enforceability of the debts on the grounds 
that they did not know of the illegal purpose for which the extended credit was eventually used.353  It 
should be noted that if clients are nonetheless successful in invalidating their gambling-related debts, 
this outcome may encourage gambling by creating a win-win situation for gamblers: they would not be 
obliged to pay their debts but might be able to collect their winnings.
{86}  Rather than having residents rely solely upon contractual unenforceability theories, states have 
also sought the cooperation of payment providers in order to address illegal gambling, both on and 
off of the Internet.  In 1997, the Florida Attorney General’s Office and Western Union entered into an 
“Agreement of Voluntary Cooperation,” by which the latter agreed to limit money transfers to specified 
offshore bookmakers, which used the telephone, mail, and the Internet as means of communications. 354  
More recently, under pressure from the New York Attorney General’s Office, Citibank, and the online 
payment provider PayPal agreed to block online gambling transactions.355  Furthermore, American 
Express and Discover prohibit the use of their cards for Internet gambling transactions, while Visa 
and MasterCard are making increasing efforts to ensure that Internet gambling activities are correctly 
identified (thereby providing banks with the possibility of refusing these transactions).356  
{87}  A variety of federal proposals and regulations have been put forth in order to reduce the 
availability of Internet gambling payment methods.  The National Gambling Impact Study Commission 
recommended national legislation that would have rendered unenforceable credit card debts incurred 
while gambling over the Internet.357  A feature of Internet gambling bills that first began appearing in 
2000 would prohibit all Internet gambling operators358 or all “unlawful” Internet gambling operators 
from “knowingly accept[ing]” a forbidden payment method.359   These prohibited payment methods are 
described as broadly as possible so as to include, for example, credit cards, electronic fund transfers, 
checks, and “any other form of financial transaction as the Secretary [of the Treasury] may prescribe 
by regulation which involves a financial institution as a payor or financial intermediary on behalf of or 
for the benefit of the other person.”360  
{88}  The Internet Gambling Payments Prohibition Act would have enabled federal banking agencies 
to order insured depository institutions not to facilitate the financial transactions of those violating 
Jonathan Gottfried- The Federal Framework for Internet Gambling
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Volume X, Issue 3
Jonathan Gottfried- The Federal Framework for Internet Gambling
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Volume X, Issue 3
the Act,361 and several bills would have allowed state and federal law enforcement agencies to obtain 
injunctions against financial intermediaries that were deemed necessary to prevent violations of illegal 
Internet gambling transactions.362
{89}  A more recent Senate bill even proposes the creation of an “Office of Electronic Funding 
Oversight” under the Department of Treasury “to coordinate Federal efforts to prohibit restricted 
transactions.”363  This office would create compulsory payment system policies and procedures 
for identifying and blocking restricted transactions which would be enforced by the Federal Trade 
Commission.364
{90}  Is novel federal legislation necessary to ensure the assistance of payment providers in targeting 
unlawful gambling?  Without any new federal legislation, the threat of lawsuits, and perhaps the 
threat posed by Congressional legislation have significantly reduced the involvement in Internet 
gambling of U.S.-based banks, credit card companies, and other online payment providers.365  It has 
been estimated that Internet gambling operators whose business relied on U.S. cardholders saw their 
revenues decline by 35-40% in 2000.366  Given that many banks and credit cards have operations in 
multiple states, a change of policy mandated in one state often leads to a change in policy throughout 
the rest of the company’s operations.367  This is not to state that Americans can no longer play and pay 
at illegal Internet casinos.  Although most U.S.-based merchant banks may block Internet gambling 
transactions, credit-card association members in jurisdictions where gambling is legal continue to 
accept Internet gambling merchants.368  A 2002 General Accounting Office survey indicated that 85% 
of those sites surveyed listed MasterCard and Visa as payment methods.369  However, if the issuing 
bank is American-based, then the transaction will probably be blocked.  It has become more difficult 
for Internet gambling operations to do business with American consumers because their transactions 
are subject to greater scrutiny and rejection.370
{91}  Yet leaving regulation of payment providers to the states will not be an effective solution if some 
states legalize Internet gambling.  North Dakota, acting alone or in conjunction with South Dakota and 
Minnesota, might have considerable difficulty influencing payment providers and is unlikely to be as 
successful as New York has been.  Furthermore, the previous paragraph dealt primarily with credit-
related transactions, although online payment providers like PayPal can also be linked directly to bank 
accounts.  Internet gambling operators will likely respond to the above trends by shifting to non-credit 
based payment methods,371 such as debit cards or various forms of electronic currency.  Allowing 
law enforcement authorities to enjoin payment providers in a fashion similar to the process used for 
“common carriers” under the Wire Act is the basic approach envisioned by recent Congressional 
legislation,372 and this would cover a comprehensive range of financial institutions and payment 
methods, promising to cut the link between Internet gambling and America’s banking system.373  
While Congress might adopt a wait-and-see approach to determine whether states can reach voluntary 
agreements with U.S.-based final institutions to address the next generation of payment providers,374 
legislation directly targeting payments to illegal gambling would “put practical enforcement ‘teeth’ 
in place that could eliminate most of the revenues online gaming operators receive from the U.S. 
market.”375
D. Online/Offline Neutrality 
{92}  Any legislation that Congress passes affecting Internet gambling should be faithful to the notion 
of online/offline consistency.  As the Presidential Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet 
stated, “substantive regulation of unlawful conduct (e.g., legislation providing for civil or criminal 
penalties for given conduct) should, as a rule, apply in the same way to conduct in the cyberworld as 
Jonathan Gottfried- The Federal Framework for Internet Gambling
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Volume X, Issue 3
Jonathan Gottfried- The Federal Framework for Internet Gambling
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Volume X, Issue 3
it does to conduct in the physical world.”376  Legislation that is built upon a snapshot of an evolving 
technology may not only inhibit that technology from evolving to address the underlying concerns,377 
such legislation also threatens to become less relevant as the technology changes.378  While this notion 
seems uncontroversial in the abstract, Congress has often hesitated to adopt it in its Internet gambling 
proposals.
{93}  Congressional Internet gambling bills that have proposed bans on Internet gambling activities 
have often created a double standard.  For example, under the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 
1997,379  a convicted online gambler would have faced a maximum sentence of four years in prison 
and could have been fined the greater of (i) $20,000, or (ii) the amount wagered over the Internet.380  In 
contrast, a gambler who illegally gambled offline would likely be untouched by federal anti-gambling 
statutes.381
{94}  This online, offline double standard was also evident in some of the Internet gambling payment 
provider legislation.  One of the bills would have allowed a situation where a gambler could have used 
one form of payment at a lawful brick and mortar gambling operation but could not have used the same 
form of payment at a lawful Internet gambling operation.382
{95}  The double standards present in Congressional bills often cannot be justified by the technology 
at issue.  For example, if the argument in favor of the bills that targeted payment providers for Internet 
gambling operations383 was that restricting payments was a means to an end,384 then there is no good 
reason why that “end” should not have been “unlawful gambling” instead of “unlawful Internet 
gambling.”  This might have led payment providers to further develop safeguard measures against 
all forms of unlawful gambling, rather than just against unlawful Internet gaming, and it would have 
assisted law enforcement authorities in cutting off access to unlawful, more “traditional” off-shore 
gaming operations,385 as well as in cutting off access to unlawful, Internet-based gambling operations. 
{96}  Furthermore, there is little reason for the proposed payment provider bills to focus on the 
Internet in order to ground themselves in a Constitutionally-permissible exercise of Congressional 
power.  Perhaps the rationale was that Internet gambling, because of its normally cross-border 
nature, is clearly within Congress’s powers under the Commerce clause, whereas other types of 
gambling may not be; however, a reference to the Internet may not be sufficient and is not necessary 
to make such an act constitutionally valid.  First, gambling over the Internet may be limited purely to 
within state boundaries,386 thereby placing Congress in the situation of regulating intrastate activity.  
Second, while earlier acts like the 1890 Act (banning, among other items, newspapers with gambling 
advertisements and lottery-related registered letters from the mail) were clearly grounded in Congress’s 
postal power,387 and while the Wire and Travel Acts both make references to “interstate or foreign 
commerce,” 388 the Organized Crime Control Act was premised upon the broad assumption that “illegal 
gambling involves widespread use of, and has an effect upon, interstate commerce and the facilities 
thereof.”389  Courts have subsequently upheld this Act, not requiring an explicit showing of connection 
with interstate commerce in order to establish a conviction under it.390  Payment providers may be 
one step removed from gambling operations; however, their link to them and the likelihood that these 
payment providers, themselves, will be agents of interstate commerce make invocation of the Internet 
constitutionally unnecessary in the Congressional legislation.391
{97}  Another argument in favor of the focus on the Internet in payment provider legislation is that 
credit is dangerous in the hands of Internet gamblers who, in the heat of the game, may rack up 
enormous debts.392  These concerns, however, extend beyond Internet gaming operations.  With respect 
to brick and mortar casinos, the NGIS Commission noted that
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[o]ne of the issues of most concern to this Commission is the ready availability of 
credit in and around casinos, which can lead to irresponsible gambling and problem 
and pathological gambling behavior.  Forty to sixty percent of the cash wagered by 
individuals in casinos is not physically brought onto the premises.393
Congressional legislation that focuses on the dangers of a novel industry, while ignoring similar 
threats posed by better-established business interests, risks being accused of indulging in inappropriate 
market protectionism.394
{98}  Congressional Internet gambling legislation has been a response to a particular type of Internet 
gambling -- a loosely regulated one.   Such businesses, however, need not be the only model.  By 
outlawing the conduct at issue,395 the legislation might allow the technology to develop in order to 
address the questionable conduct.  If Congress is intent on targeting payment providers, Congress 
should pass an Unlawful Gambling Funding Prohibition Act instead of proposing an Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act.396  As the Department of Justice has noted, Congressional 
“legislation . . . should be applied to illegal gambling, whether that gambling occurs over the 
telephone, or whether that gambling occurs over the internet, or whether that gambling occurs in any 
other way.”397
VI. CONCLUSION
{99}  Online gaming has not escaped the states’ regulatory abilities, and most prosecutions against 
online gaming operators have, in fact, been brought by state attorneys general using state law.398   
Unregulated Internet gaming, however, has undermined states’ abilities to determine their gaming 
policies, and current federal legislation, while sufficient to establish subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident Internet gaming operators, lacks adequate enforcement mechanisms 
to support the states.  Consequently, reforms to federal gambling legislation that are written in as 
“medium-neutral” a fashion as possible should focus on empowering law enforcement authorities 
to enjoin payment providers from servicing gambling businesses that operate in jurisdictions where 
the gambling at issue is illegal.  In contrast, the Wire Act will be of limited use against unlawful 
Internet gaming because of the constitutional and technological problems underlying IP blocking.  
Furthermore, Congress should reexamine the assumption of a connection between crime and all 
gambling -- legal and illegal -- that underlies the Wire Act’s broad wording.  This might lead Congress 
to repeal the Wire Act or to expand its safe harbor to include wagers from and to jurisdictions in which 
the gambling at issue is legal.  Should IP blocking technology become more precise, Congress might 
also consider updating the Wire Act to apply to casino-style games399 and ensuring that the Act applies 
to a broad range of communications, regardless of whether they are “wired.”400  Revising the Wagering 
Paraphernalia Act to include items, such as websites, might additionally be considered; however, since 
the Act’s sanctions are limited to prison and/or fines, it would not be effective against nonresident 
defendants with few ties to the United States.
{100}  In keeping with traditional deference of the federal government to states in the realm of 
gambling, states should have the discretion to decide whether to permit or prohibit Internet gaming 
operations within their borders.  The relationship between the federal government and states in matters 
of gambling should be no different after the advent of Internet blackjack than it was before. 
{101}  The regulations of the Nevada Gaming Commission total over 1,100 pages,401 and regulations 
of Internet gaming would probably be no less complex.  The above discussion has merely sought to 
emphasize that the differences between online and offline gaming do not justify radical legislative 
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departures from federal gambling policy.  Consequently, neither federal prohibition nor surrender to 
the market’s invisible hand is warranted.   The limited Congressional action suggested above, rather 
than being an example of Congressional disregard for state powers, would in fact strengthen states’ 
decision-making abilities and would follow in the footsteps of a delicate state-federal government 
equilibrium in the realm of gaming.
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103 Lasseters Online, Terms and Conditions, §§ 4.1, 4.2, at http://www.lasseters.com.au/footer/terms.asp (last updated May 
2002).
104 See Press Release, Lasseters Online,  Lasseters Comment on Credit Card Rejection (Aug. 11, 2000), at 
http://koala.lasseters.com.au/mediaroom/releases/11aug00_1.htm.
105 Netbets, supra note 66, § 4.31.
106 Cooperation on an international level is also desirable.  For example, the Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering, an intergovernmental body established by the G-7, has recommended that a series of due diligence and record-
keeping requirements be met by “non-financial businesses and professions,” including “Internet casinos.”  Financial 
Action Task Force on Money Laundering, The Forty Recommendations, at 7, 14, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/26/
2789371.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
107 Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1118 (1970) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5326 
(2003)).
108 Casino Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 5065 (Feb. 6, 1985) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(n)(7)(i) (2002)).  
However, Nevada casinos enjoy certain exemptions from this Act.  See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(5) (2000); see also Nev. 
Gaming Comm’n § 6A.030 (2003). 
109 See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1956-1957 (2003)); Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2243 (codified as amended 
at 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2003)).
110 See 31 C.F.R. § 103.30(a)(1)(i) (2002) (indicating $10,000 as reporting figure); 12 U.S.C. §§1954-1957 (2002) indicating 
that federal charges can be brought against violators of statutory requirements).
111 The Bank Secrecy Act currently applies only to financial transactions that involve physical transfers of currency. See 
Straub, supra note 98, at 523.
112 For details on how the Bank Secrecy Act and related legislation may be updated to address electronic money laundering, 
see id. at 529-30.
113 The DSM-IV does not place “problem gambling” in a diagnostic category.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 312.31 (4th ed. 2000).
114 Id. 
115 National Gambling Final Report, supra note 1, at 4-5,  at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/4.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2003).
116 Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, § 6.1.
117 Id. § 6.20.
118 National Gambling Final Report, supra note 1, at 4-11, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/4.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
119 Netbets, supra note 58, § 3.28.
120 National Gambling Final Report, supra note 1, at 2-5,  at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/2.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2003).
121 Lang, supra note 56, at 550 (quoting Jenna F. Karadbil, Note, Casinos of the Next Millennium: A Look into the Proposed 
Ban on Internet Gambling, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 439 (2000)). 
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122 See Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, §§ 8-11 to 8-12.
123 National Gambling Final Report, supra note 1, at 4-1, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/4.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2003).  “The ‘past year’ estimates of American adults who gamble is 125 million.  Based on the data available to 
the Commission, we estimate that about 117.5 million American adult gamblers do not evidence negative consequences.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  “Negative consequences” include pathological or problem gambling.  See id.  The Report more 
specifically defines “problem gambling” as “a wide range of adverse consequences from their gambling, but fall[ing] 
below the threshold of at least five of the ten APA [American Psychological Association] DSM-IV criteria used to define 
pathological gambling”).  Id.  “Today the vast majority of Americans either gamble recreationally and experience no 
measurable side effects related to their gambling, or they choose not to gamble at all.”  Id. at 1-1, at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/1.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
 
124 Id. at 4-15 to 4-16, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/4.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).  
125 The category of “problem gamblers” includes, as discussed by the Productivity Commission, those who demonstrate 
some of the severe gambling problems previously mentioned, as well as less severe combinations of problems such as 
chasing losses, guilt, arguments and concealment of gambling.  Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, § 6.20.
126 Id. § 7.1 
127 Id. § 3.19; see also Tom W. Bell, Gambler’s Web: Why On-Line Betting Can’t Be Stopped -- and Why Washington 
Shouldn’t Bother Trying, REASON, Oct. 1, 1999, at http://www.cato.org/dailys/12-01-99.html.  In his article, Mr. Bell notes:
Real-world casinos, we hear, lure gamblers into windowless caverns far from the real world, with money 
traps at every turn and free-flowing booze.  Sadly, they give customers places to socialize, creating little 
communities that console losers and - for a price - minister to the lonely.  True or not, such criticisms 
certainly do not apply to Internet gambling, which must vie with slamming doors, barking dogs, and 
other household distractions.  Online gamblers have to buy their own drinks, too, and console themselves 
when they lose.
See Bell.
128 See James Popkin, Tricks of the Trade, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 14, 1994, reprinted in THE REFERENCE SHELF: 
GAMBLING (Andrew Riconda ed., 1995).
129 Id. 
130 Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, § 18.21.  This does not rule out the possibility that Internet gambling may 
simply create a new breed of pathological gambler.  See Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public 
Policy and the Law, 64 MISS. L.J. 291, 336 (1995) (“Rather than providing compulsive gamblers with a legal alternative to 
the already existing forms of gambling, legalized gambling tends to encourage non-gamblers to begin gambling.  This, of 
course, creates new potential problem gamblers.”) (citation omitted).
131 David Ohlson, Internet Gambling (May 1999) (paper presented at the Second National Gambling Regulation 
Conference, Australian Institute of Criminology in Conjunction with the Australian Institute for Gambling Research 4), at 
http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/gambling99/ohlson.pdf.
132 Lasseters’ Submissions, supra note 4, at 20.
133 Ohlson, supra note 131, at 4.
134 Netbets, supra note 58, §§ 3.78-3.85.
136 Interactive Gambling (Player Protection) Act, 1998, § 137 (Queensl.), available at http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/
LEGISLTN/ACTS/1998/98AC014.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).  See generally Interactive Gaming Council Online, 
Mission Statement, at http://www.igcouncil.org/aboutus.php?do=mission (last visited Oct. 4, 2003) (describing itself as “a 
non-profit trade association that serves as a collective voice for the interactive gaming industry”).  The site also provides 
suggestions for Internet gambling operators on how to address pathological gambling.  See Interactive Gaming Council 
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Online, Information for Interactive Gambling Operators, at http://www.igcouncil.org/info_for_ig_oper.htm (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2003).
137 Netbets, supra note 58, § 3.82; see also Lang, supra note 56, at 550 (“Cybercasinos can preserve records of excessive 
gambling or gambling debts indefinitely.  Such tracking is actually more reliable than the pit boss’ memory, which is the 
current source of reliability that land-based casinos use to combat compulsive gamblers.”)
138 See Netbets, supra note 58, at tbls.1.2 & 3.5.
139 Id. § 3.34.
 
140 National Gambling Final Report, supra note 1, § 7-24, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/7.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2003).
141 Id. § 7-20 (citing HOWARD SHAFFER, ET AL., ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF DISORDERED GAMBLING BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND CANADA: A META-ANALYSIS 5 (1997)).
142 Id. § 7-24. 
143 Id. § 7-20 (citing HOWARD SHAFFER ET AL., ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF DISORDERED GAMBLING BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND CANADA: A META-ANALYSIS 5 (1997)).
144 See, e.g., Drugs and the Internet, An Overview of the Threat to America’s Youth, NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER 
(Dec. 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs0/682/internet.htm#Top (last visited Oct. 4, 2003) (noting that “85 
percent of Americans aged 12-24 now use the Internet regularly”).
145 Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, § 18.22 (emphasis added).
146 Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, §§ 18-22 to 18-23.  The contract that players must sign during the 
registration process may also invalidate any prizes won by minors.  For example, Lasseters’ contract states “[w]innings are 
subject to Lasseters Online verification procedures before payment.”  Lasseters Online, Terms and Conditions, § 11, at 
http://www.lasseters.com.au/footer/terms.asp (last updated May 2002).  Moreover, 
All Players must be at least 18 years of age to be eligible to register with Lasseters Online and play for 
cash or points, and to qualify for any prizes.  The placement of any bets by minors is an offence under 
Australian law the provision of any false particulars to Lasseters Online in relation to age, name and 
address also constitutes a chargeable offence under law.
Id. § 3.4.
147 See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (2000) (“A cardholder shall be liable for the unauthorized use of a credit card only if ... 
the liability is not in excess of $50.”).
148 See, e.g., John Warren Kindt, The Failure to Regulate the Gambling Industry Effectively: Incentives for Perpetual 
Non-Compliance, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 219, 238 (2003) (“[T]wo Missouri riverboat casinos, Station and Harrah’s, were each 
fined $250,000 for an incident in June, 2000 when a 16-year-old girl used false identification to board and gamble . . . .”); 
John Warren Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 75 (1994) (noting that 
“Despite laws in Atlantic City restricting the casinos to persons twenty-one years and over, a [1985] survey of teenagers 
in an Atlantic City high school revealed 64% of the teenagers had gambled in a [brick ‘n mortar] casino . . . ”); Bell, supra 
note 127 (“[Gambling] [w]eb sites have an advantage over their offline counterparts.  The former can automatically check 
the identity and age of every player who walks through the virtual door.  The latter rely, at best, on hunches about high heels 
and facial hair.  State lotteries, which sell tickets through machines, do even less to guard against underage gambling.”).
149 Gaming Control (Internet Gaming) Regulations § 61 (N. Terr. 2002), available at http://notes.nt.gov.au/dcm/legislat/
legislat.nsf/0/888cad441702eaab69256c670082bac2/$FILE/Repg006R7.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
150 Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, § 18.22.
151 See Netbets, supra note 58, § 4.52. 
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152 See Rychlak, supra note 130, at 344 (“Some of the newer Mississippi casinos even have playrooms and video arcades 
for children.  If parents begin bringing their children to the casinos on a regular basis, it can become a family tradition just 
like going to a baseball game or going on a picnic.”).
153 Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, §§ 18.22 to 18.23.
154 Id.  (“[H]ome-based gambling does represent an increase in exposure, which may further normalise gambling. Whether 
this is seen as an adverse outcome depends on complex judgments about community and family norms.”).
155 2001 Nev. Stat. 3(2)(b).
156AUS Model, supra note 65, at 20.
157 E-mail from Lasseters Online Customer Support to Jonathan Gottfried (June 5, 2003) (on file with Richmond Journal of 
Law & Technology). 
158 Lasseters Online, Terms of Use, § 1.9, at http://www.lasseters.com.au/defaultnew.asp?bodyPage=terms&pagePath=restri
cted&ext=asp (last modified Sept. 2003).
159 Id. § 1.10.  Procedures such as that of Lasseters Online are more likely to be effective when the customer base is 
geographically limited.  For example, a Nevada operator is less likely to know whether a water bill from the occasional 
customer in Liberia is legitimate than to know whether a water bill from his own state is legitimate.  
160 See, e.g., Paymentech L.P., Address Verification Service, at http://www.paymentech.com/sol_frapro_carnotpre_
carasctoo_page.jsp (last modified Sept. 8, 2003); Paymentech L.P., Age Verification, at http://www.paymentech.com/sol_
frapro_carnotpre_agever_page.jsp (last modified Sept. 8, 2003). 
161 John Edmond Hogan, World Wide Wager: The Feasibility of Internet Gambling Regulation; 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 
815, 823 n.36 (1998). 
162 Lawrence Lessig, Privacy, Jurisdiction and the Regulation of Free Expression, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 
vs. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 629, 649-50 (1998).
163 See Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1345, 1395 (2001) (providing descriptions of various companies that claim to identify the physical locations of 
individuals based on IP analysis with up to  99% accuracy for targeting states).  But see Benjamin Edelman, Shortcomings 
and Challenges in the Restriction of Internet Transmissions of Over-the-Air Television Content to Canadian Internet 
Users, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/pubs/jump-
091701.pdf (last modified Sept. 8, 2003).  Mr. Edelman argues that:
the accuracy of geographic analysis systems – which is substantially impeded in the first place by the 
lack of reliable information about the location of the devices identified with particular IP addresses – is 
further hindered by the rise in deployment of proxy servers, tunneling systems, and terminal services.  
Such systems can cause geographic analysis systems to draw erroneous conclusions about the locations 
of end users; thus, their increased use reduces the accuracy of geographic analysis tools.
Id.
164 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 1120  (stating that “government regulates an activity by raising the activity’s 
costs in a manner that achieves desired ends”). 
165 See supra note 7 and surrounding text.
166 See, e.g., Ill. P.A. 91-257 2g1(A)(C) (criminalizing both the Internet gambling operator as well as the Internet gambler); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.90.3 (West 1998) (making a misdemeanor a transaction via the Internet involving “a game, 
contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize a profit”); South 
Dakota HB 1110 (Enrolled) sec. 7-9 (sanctioning anyone “engaged in a gambling business”); Oregon SB 318, NRS 
465.091 (targeting payment methods to Internet gaming operators as well as collection of gaming debts); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 465.092 (Michie 1997) (sanctioning Internet betting as well as any operator who accepts a wager from a person 
within Nevada).  
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167 See, e.g., People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that an 
Internet gambling operation violated section 225 of the New York Penal Code, which prohibits “unlawful gambling 
activity”); see also Joel Michael Schwarz, The Internet Gambling Fallacy Craps Out, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1021, 1035-
36 (1999) (arguing that Internet gambling is illegal in New York, Indiana, New Jersey and Wisconsin based on general 
gambling statutes in those states).   
168 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the Minnesota 
attorney general filed suit against a Belizean Internet gaming operator); World Interactive Gaming Corp. supra note 67 
(noting that a New York attorney general filed suit against a Delaware corporation with an Antiguan casino subsidiary).  
Also, New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer has reached agreements with Citibank and PayPal to limit online payments 
from New York to gambling operators.  See Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Press Release, 
Agreement Reached with PayPal to Bar New Yorkers from OnLine Gambling (Aug. 21, 2002), at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug21a_02.html.
169 Hearings on Proposals to Regulate Illegal Internet Gambling: Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban 
Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut State Attorney General, Representing the 
National Association of Attorney Generals), available at http://www.senate.gov/~banking/03_03hrg/031803/blumenth.htm.
170 See id.; see also Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Technology and Terrorism,  106th Cong. (1999) 
(statement of Betty, Ohio Attorney General Montgomery), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/32399bm.htm.  In 
her testimony, Ms. Montgomery gives, as one rationale for supporting federal gambling legislation, that “law enforcement 
resources of the State of Ohio, even as part of a coordinated response by several states, can have only a limited effect on 
Internet gambling.”  Id.
171 National Gambling Final Report, supra note 1 at 5-12, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/5.pdf.
172 See Hogan, supra note 161, at 851 (noting that “virtually all known Internet gambling providers remaining within the 
United States have sold or relocated their sites”). 
173 Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 742 (W.D. Tex. 1998). 
174 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2003).
175 Exec. Order No. 13,333, App. F § 2 (Aug. 5, 1999),  available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/append.htm.
176 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2003).  The Act offers safe-harbor for
the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sporting 
events or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a 
sporting event or contest from a State or foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest is 
legal into a State or foreign country in which such betting is legal.
Id.
177 18 U.S.C. § 1084(d) (2003).  
178 National Gambling Final Report, supra note 1 at 5-12, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/5.pdf.
179 Id.
180 Adrian Goss, Jay Cohen’s Brave New World: The Liability of Offshore Operators of Licensed Internet Casinos for 
Breach of United States Anti-Gambling Laws, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 32 (2001).  
181 United States v. McDonough, 835 F.2d 1103, 1104 (5th Cir. 1988).
182 Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195, 198-99 (1st Cir. 1966).
183 See GAO Report, supra note 75, at 16.
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184 Letter from Robert Kennedy, Attorney General, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Aug. 6, 1961) 
(reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2634).
185 People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 850-51 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
186 See GAO Report, supra note 75, at 3 (stating that the “DOJ generally takes the view that the Wire Act is not limited to 
sports-related gambling activities, but case law on this issue is conflicting”).  But see Statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, 
supra note 49 (stating that the Wire Act “may relate only to sports betting and not to the type of real-time interactive 
gambling (e.g., poker) that the Internet now makes possible for the first time”).
187 In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001).
188 Id. at 480.
189 Id. at 482.
190 “As to the legislative intent at the time the Wire Act was enacted, the House Judiciary Committed Chairman explained 
that ‘this particular bill involves the transmission of wagers or bets and layoffs on horse racing and other sporting events.’”  
Id. at 480-81 (citing 107 CONG. REC. 16533 (1961)).  But see Schwarz, supra note 167, at 1030.  In his article, Mr. Schwarz 
notes:
[T]he legislative history of the Wire Act indicates that it was intended to be applied broadly so as to 
prevent any interstate or international transmission of gambling information to or from the United States 
using wire communication facilities.  As former U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy wrote, “[t]he 
purpose of [the Wire Act] is to aid . . . in the suppression of organized gambling activities by prohibiting 
the use of or the leasing, furnishing, or maintaining of wire communication facilities which are or will be 
used for the transmission of certain gambling information in interstate and foreign commerce.”
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 87-967, at 1 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631)).
191 In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 481 (E.D. La. 2001) (citing Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, 
S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999)).  In support of the argument that the Wire Act does not cover non-sports-related gambling, 
one might point to the title of the Wire Act legislation: Sporting Events -- Transmission of Bets, Wagers, and Related 
Information, Pub. L. No. 87-216, § 2, 75 Stat. 491, 552-53 (1961).  One might also compare the Wire Act to the Wagering 
Paraphernalia Act, both of which were enacted by Congress in 1961 as part of the fight against organized crime.  Whereas 
the Wagering Paraphernalia Act specifically refers in separate subsections to “bookmaking,” “wagering pools with respect 
to a sporting event,” “numbers, policy, bolita or similar game,” 18 U.S.C. § 1953(a), the Wire Act refers only to “bets or 
wagers on any sporting event or contest.”  18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2003).
192 18 U.S.C. § 1081 (2003). 
193 GAO Report, supra note 75, at 17.
194 18 U.S.C. § 1081 (2003).
195 Goss, supra note 180, ¶ 22.
196 Id. ¶ 21.
197 Cheyenne Sales, Ltd. v. Western Union Financial Services Int’l, 8 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
198 Id. at 474. 
199 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (2002). 
200 18 U.S.C. § 1953(a) (2002). 
201 People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 853 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).  It is unclear in this case why 
the court did not recognize the exception for “the transportation of betting materials to be used in the placing of bets 
or wagers on a sporting event into a State in which such betting is legal under the statutes of that State.”  18 U.S.C. § 
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1953(b)(2) (2003).
202 107 CONG. REC. 16,537 (1961) (statement of Rep. Emmanuel Celler, Chair, House Jud. Comm.).  The legislative history 
of the Paraphernalia Act suggests a broad reading of the statute’s applicability based on the fact that it was enacted to close 
loopholes created by narrow court interpretations of anti-lottery statutes.  See H.R. REP. NO. 87-968 (1961), reprinted in 
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2634.  
203 United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1989).
204 Id. at 1187.  The Court stated, “Congress employed broad language to ‘permit law enforcement to keep pace with the 
latest developments . . .’ because organized crime has shown ‘great ingenuity in avoiding the law.’” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 
87-589).
205 Id.
206 Brown, supra note 15, at 635.
207 Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, No. 1: CV-93-0814, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12790 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 1993), 
overruled on separate grounds by Pic-A-State Pa. v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Revenue, 42 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1994).
208 Id. at *9.
209 United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1974).
210 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2003).  “Facility” has been held to include telephone lines.  See United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp. 
907 (E.D. Ill. 1962).
211 The Travel Act does not offer any definition of “gambling,” making this a question of statutory interpretation. 
212 United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62 (3d  Cir. 1966) (using Travel Act against employees of illegal casinos who crossed 
state lines in order to commute to their jobs).
213 See, e.g., United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1971) 
(noting the Travel Act was used to prosecute a bookmaker who conducted his illegal interstate operations via telephone).
214 Cabot, supra note 95, at 130.
215 People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
216 Id.  One of the unsuccessful plaintiffs in In re MasterCard alleged a violation of the Travel Act against a credit card 
company and issuing bank whose card the plaintiff had used at an Internet casino.  In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 
2d 468, 478 (E.D. La. 2001).  However, the court never addressed this issue because it failed to find a predicate violation of 
state or federal law.  Id. at 482.
217 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1) (2003).
218 GAO Report, supra note 75, at 14; see also United States v. Schullo, 363 F. Supp. 246, 249-50 (D. Minn. 1973), aff’d, 
508 F.2d 1200 (1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975) (“Congress’ intent was to include all those who participate in 
the operation of a gambling business, regardless of how minor their roles, and whether they be labeled agents, runners, 
independent contractors or the like.”).
219 See, e.g., United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that the Act is nonetheless grounded in the 
Commerce Clause); United States v. Kerrigan, 514 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1975). 
220 United States v. Truesdale, 152 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1998).  The court reversed a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1955 for 
failure to prove an underlying offense of Texas law.
221 James H. Frey, Federal Involvement in U.S. Gaming Regulation, 556 ANNALS  AM. ACAD.  POL. & SOC. SCI. 138, 142 
(1998).  
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222 S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 80 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 38621, 39906.
223 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2003).  A “‘pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one 
of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years [excluding any 
period of imprisonment] after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. Id. 
224 See SF42 ALI-ABA 827, 830 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d)(2003)).  18 U.S.C. § 1962 states, in part:
(a) Using or investing income that is derived from a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of 
unlawful debt in an enterprise; (b) Acquiring or maintaining an interest in or control of an enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of unlawful debt; (c) Conducting the 
affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. § 1962 
(c); and (d) Conspiring to commit one of these three acts.
Id.
225 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2003).
226 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)(b) (2003).
227 18 U.S.C. § 1963-4 (2003).
228 See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, tit. 9, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/110mcrm.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) (discussing organized crime and racketeering).    
The Department of Justice has noted, “[u]tilization of the RICO statute, more so than most other federal criminal sanctions, 
requires particularly careful and reasoned application…. A RICO count which merely duplicates the elements of proof of 
traditional Hobbs Act, Travel Act, mail fraud, wire fraud, gambling or controlled substances cases, will not be approved 
unless it serves some special RICO purpose.”  Id.   With respect to Internet gambling, RICO has been primarily used by 
private plaintiffs to sue credit card companies that have been associated with Internet gambling operations.  Id.
229 See, e.g., In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 475 (E.D. La. 2001) (stating that the court failed to find credit 
card companies “directed, guided, conducted, or participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise though 
a pattern of racketeering activity and/or collection of unlawful debt . . . as defined by RICO”); Jubelirer v. MasterCard Int’l 
Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (W.D. Wis. 1999).  In Jubelirer, the court stated:
[The] Plaintiff has alleged facts which make it apparent that the only relationship between the on-line 
casino and the defendants is a routine contractual relationship for the provision of consumer financing.  
That relationship does not constitute a RICO enterprise and the performance of such services does not 
constitute the operation or management of an enterprise.
Id. at 1052.
230 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
231 Goss, supra note 180, ¶ 39. 
232 See generally EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), citing Foley Brothers Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 
285 (1949). “It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, 
is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . .’  We assume that Congress legislates 
against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.” Id.
233 See, e.g., U.S. Patriot Act, Title III, § 377, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 342 (2001) (“Grants the United States 
extraterritorial jurisdiction where: (1) an offense committed outside the United States involves an access device issued, 
owned, managed, or controlled by a financial institution . . . .”) (emphasis added).
234 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1952 to 1955 (2003).  However it could be argued that the references to “foreign 
commerce” in § 1084(a) and § 1952(a) indicate that Congress intended to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Id.; see also 
Goss, supra note 180, ¶ 41.
235 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2003).
Jonathan Gottfried- The Federal Framework for Internet Gambling
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Volume X, Issue 3
Jonathan Gottfried- The Federal Framework for Internet Gambling
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Volume X, Issue 3
236 See United States v. Ross, 1999 WL 782749, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1999) (asserting jurisdiction over Internet sports 
betting operator that was based in Curacao); People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1999).  In World Interactive Gaming Corp., the court notes:
[F]or respondents’ claim that none of the federal statutes apply to operation of an Internet casino licensed 
by a foreign government, there is nothing in the record or the law to support their contentions. To 
the contrary, the Wire Act, Travel Act and Paraphernalia Act all apply despite the fact that the betting 
instructions are transmitted from outside the United States over the Internet.
Id.  It should be noted that the defendant in World Interactive Gaming was a Delaware corporation and its subsidiary was 
Antiguan.
237 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1945).
238 Id. at 444.
239 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-98 (1993).
240 Id. at 799 (holding that London reinsurers’ refusal to sell certain types of reinsurance to insurers in the U.S. violated the 
Sherman Act, despite the legality of the act under British law).  The court then balanced this conflict against a situation in 
which there is a direct conflict between U.S. and another nation’s laws.  When a foreign law requires a company “to act in 
some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States,” the circumstances may justify refraining from exercising subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Id.  Considering, however, that no country’s law requires an Internet casino to offer its services to U.S. 
citizens and that verification procedures exist to enable online casinos to exclude the bulk of U.S. clients, it seems unlikely 
that Internet casinos could invoke a direct conflict of laws as a defense to subject matter jurisdiction. 
241 Id. at 797-98.
242 See supra Part III.
243 See Goss, supra note 180, ¶ 47 (“To the extent that online gaming threatens the viability of a significant industry that 
employs large numbers of Americans and generates considerable profits, such gaming has a significant effect in the United 
States.”).
244 See id. ¶ 48 (“As people move from traditional to online gaming, there is likely to be a decrease in taxation revenue 
generated by gaming unless technology or regulation makes online tax collection possible.”).
245 See id. ¶ 44.  Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, prosecuting foreign Internet gaming operators does not amount 
to the U.S. imposing its moral views on other countries.  If Antiguans want to gamble on Antiguan or other foreign online 
gaming sites, then they are free to do so.  However, foreign gambling operations whose business is deliberately based on 
an American clientele (by using, for example, advertisements targeted to a U.S. audience) should not be viewed as neutral 
bystanders who become the unwitting victims of a bullying American policy.  In 2001, Antigua had around 100 gaming 
online operators, in contrast to the approximately 40 remaining today.  See Bradley Vallerius, Antigua Moves Forward with 
WTO Claim vs. U.S., INTERACTIVE GAMING NEWS, June 25, 2003 (on file with the Richmond Journal of Law & Technology).  
According to Sir Ronald Sanders, an Antiguan foreign affairs representative, “the effect of the United States enforcement 
of its laws is to hurt the small economy of Antigua and Barbuda.”  Sir Ronald Sanders, Statement to the Dispute Settlement 
Body of the World Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland (June 24, 2003), available at http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/
busnss_politics/body_sirronaldwto_statement.html.  This may suggest that a fair number of these Internet gambling 
operators were dependant upon American revenues.  As one commentator has noted, “[t]he United States must not allow 
individuals to take advantage of advances in communications technology to intentionally violate federal and state laws 
simply by moving offshore.”  Lynch, supra note 6, at 201.
246 See, e.g., People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
247 See id.  But see United States v. Truesdale, 152 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a Caribbean-based gambling 
operation that had the potential to accept bets from Texas residents, although there was no specific evidence that it had, did 
not violate Texas’ anti-gambling statutes).  In Truesdale, the court stated:
Jones and his co-appellants went to great effort to make sure that their operation was legal.  They set 
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up offshore offices and consulted with lawyers in the United States and abroad on the legality of their 
enterprise; they furnished the Caribbean local offices with desks and telephones and staffed them 
with personnel to accept international phone wagers; they set up separate phone lines that could be 
used to place bets in the offshore offices.  Under these circumstances, without specific evidence of 
any wrongdoing, it is irrational to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that after having gone through 
the effort of fully equipping, staffing, and widely advertising the Caribbean offices, the appellants 
nevertheless illegally accepted bets in the United States.
Id. at 448 (emphasis added).  Absent specific evidence of an illegal transaction, the mere fact that the Internet gaming site 
can be accessed by a jurisdiction’s residents may be insufficient to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.  Id.
248 World Interactive Gaming, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
249 Id. at 850 (citing N.Y. CLS PENAL § 225(2) (2003)).
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 852.
252 Id. at 851; see also Schwarz, supra note 167, at 1038-39 (noting that often Internet gamblers try to unsuccessfully 
argue they are not bound by federal or state laws because they have legally purchased licenses in other countries and have 
“physically located” hardware there).
253 Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 742 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
254 See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
255 See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1984).
256 Id. at 414-16.
257 See Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS v. Kenneth, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992) (construing Dollar Savings Bank v. First 
Securities Bank, 746 F.2d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 1984)).
258 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)); see also 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985). 
259 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940)).
260 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
261 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
262 Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292).
263 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 114. 
264 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); accord  Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard 
Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999); Resnick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 462, 467-68 (E.D. Pa. 1999).   
265 Zippo, 952 F. Supp at 1124 (citations omitted). 
266 Am. Homecare Fed’n v. Paragon Scientific Corp., 27 F. Supp.2d 109, 114 (D. Conn. 1998).  Courts may be moving 
away from Zippo towards a more purely effects-based test.  See Geist, supra note 171, at 1371-72.  Nevertheless, this 
more recent test would not hinder courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over Internet gambling operations given the 
numerous effects that such operations may have on a forum.  See supra Part III.
267 State v. Granite Gate Resorts Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 720-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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268 Id. at 720.
269 Id. at 719 (noting Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).
270 Id. at 720.
271 Id. at 721.
272 Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 744 (W.D. Tex. 1998); see also People v World Interactive Gaming 
Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 857-58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (finding personal jurisdiction over a New York-headquartered 
company that had established an Antigua-based Internet casino because all of the administrative and executive decisions 
were made in New York, advertising had been done nationally and reached thousands of New Yorkers, and the company 
had received phone calls from New York residents on a toll-free number).
273 Goss, supra note 140, ¶¶ 75-76.
274 714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
275 Id. at 855.
276 Id. at 861.
277 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
278 Id. at 745 (citations omitted).
279 See, e.g., State by Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (“The state has an 
interest in enforcing consumer protection statutes and regulating gambling.”); People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 
714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (referring to New York state’s “deep-rooted policy against unauthorized 
gambling”). 
280 Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1216 (1998).
281 H.R. Rep. No. 1549, at 4029 (1970). 
282 For example, the Sixth Circuit has liberally interpreted the Illegal Gambling Act, holding that janitors as well as “runners, 
telephone clerks, salesmen, dealers, doormen and watchmen ‘conduct’ gambling businesses within the meaning of the statute.” 
United States v. Merrell, 701 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1983). 
283 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084(a), (d) (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 1953(c) (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) 
(2003); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (2003).
284 Lynch, supra note 6, at 178.  The Wire Act has been used, though, against American citizens living abroad.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing a defendant bookmaker with American citizenship who 
resided in the Dominican Republic). 
285 Extradition requests are often based on treaties that require that the defendant’s action be a crime in both jurisdictions.  
Goldsmith, supra note 280, at 1216-20.  This is the case, for example, between the U.S. and the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines).  See Extradition Treaty, Oct. 10, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-19, art. 2, available at 1996 WL 913075.  
Extradition clearly cannot be relied upon when the defendant’s activity is not only legal in the foreign jurisdiction but 
even licensed by the foreign government.  The same logic would suggest that the legal theory of comity, “diplomatic 
niceties performed by countries out of a sense of international etiquette rather than binding obligation,” would be equally 
unsuccessful in securing a foreign defendant.  Jay Hall, International Comity and U.S. Federal Common Law, 84 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 326 (1990).
286 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (derived from former 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088-89, repealed by 62 Stat. 
862, 866); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211; 47 C.F.R. § 76.213.  However, some of this legislation is facing increased scrutiny.  See, 
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e.g., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999)  (The Supreme Court held that 
the FCC could not prevent a Louisiana broadcasting association from airing advertisements for private, offline casinos 
in Louisiana, where such gambling was legal, simply because residents in Texas or Arkansas, where private commercial 
casino gambling was not legal, might hear the emissions.).
287 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 157 (1999).  Again, please note that the author is referring 
to the type of technologies that existed during the enactment of the relevant statutes and up until recently.  These 
generalizations do not apply, for example, to digital telephone networks or cable modems which follow distributed/random 
transmission models.  Id. at 44.
288 See ROBERT H. REID, ARCHITECTS OF THE WEB: 1,000 DAYS THAT BUILT THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS xx (1997).
289 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODES AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 32 (1999).
290 Id.
291 See ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING 
THE WORLD WE KNOW 16 (1999).
292 LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 44.
293 Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 654 (2003).
 
294 However, states have succeeded in pursuing third parties, such as payment providers, that are associated with Internet 
gaming operators.  These enforcement measures are discussed in Part V(c).  
295 S. 1495, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2380, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 474, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3125, 106th Cong. 
(2000); S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 4419, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 5020, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 3004, 107th 
Cong. (2001); H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2579 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 3215, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 3006, 
107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 1223, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 627, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 21, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2143, 
108th Cong. (2003).
296 141 CONG. REC. S19110-07 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
297 H.R. 2380, 105th Cong. (1997).
298 While federal statutes do not, in general, criminally sanction the individual gambler, there are other federal efforts that 
seek to dissuade individuals from gambling.  See Charles W. Blau, Federal Tax Issues, in FEDERAL GAMBLING LAW 283, 
286 (Anthony N. Cabot ed. 1999) (suggesting that the federal income tax regulations on gambling are designed “to punish 
the gambler for participating in an immoral activity”).  Furthermore, some state statutes, such as those of Louisiana and 
Illinois, provide sanctions for Internet gamblers.  See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3(D)(E)(I)(2003); and Ill. Laws 257.
299 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2003).
300 See United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.R.I. 1981)
301 It applies to “[w]hoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign 
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (2003).
302 United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088 (5th Cir. 1993).
303 Id. at 1094 (citing McIntosh v. United States, 385 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1967)); see also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 
808, 811 (1971) (“[I]t cannot be said, with certainty sufficient to justify a criminal conviction, that Congress intended that 
interstate travel by mere customers of a gambling establishment should violate the Travel Act.”).
304 See, e.g., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972) (discussing a bookmaking operation that sent scratch 
sheets across state lines); United States v. Fabrizio, 385 U.S. 263 (1966) (noting that a defendant sold New Hampshire 
sweepstake tickets in New York); United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that defendants sold 
a bookmaking computer program across state lines); United States v. Scaglione, 446 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that a 
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defendant sent in interstate commerce “flash paper” [paper which could be easily burned in the event of a police search] for 
use in gambling activities); United States v. Baker, 364 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1966) (noting that defendants shipped tickets for 
Haiti-based lottery through the mail).
305 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2003); see also United States v. Schullo, 363 F. Supp. 246, 249-50 (D. Minn. 1973) (“Congress’ intent 
was to include all those who participate in the operation of a gambling business, regardless of how minor their roles, and 
whether they be labeled agents, runners, independent contractor or the like. Only customers of the business were to be 
excluded.”).
306 Kelly, supra, note 17, at 142 (citing Letter from L. Anthony Sutin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Patrick 
Leahy (May 26, 1998)); see also Hogan, supra, note 161, at 847 n.152  (“Enforcement problems alone may preclude 
suits against individuals . . . .  [L]aw enforcement agencies would wind up pursuing an inexhaustible supply of small time 
bettors, while a hundred or so sites continue to reap the benefits of the millions who cannot be caught.”)
307 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 19, at 957.
308 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2003).
309 See, e.g., H.R. 5020, 106th Cong. (2002); S. 692, 106th Cong. (2002); S. 3006, 107th Cong. (2002). 
310 See, e.g., H.R. 5020, 106th Cong. (2002); S. 692, 106th  Cong. (2002); S. 3006, 107th Cong. (2002).
311 H.R. 21, 108th Cong. (2003).
312 Ben Edelman, Web Sites Sharing IP Addresses: Prevalence and Significance, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/
edelman/ip-sharing/ (last updated Sept 12, 2003).
313 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980) (citations omitted) (“The 
government may ban . . . commercial speech related to illegal activity.”).
314 R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 755, 772-73 (1999).
315 Goldsmith, supra note 280, at 1229-30.
316 See Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
317 Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV.653, 655 (2003). 
318 See, e.g., id at 685 (noting that “China’s destination ISPs began to search data packets for particular sensitive 
keywords”).
319 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(i) (2003).
320 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(1) (2003).  The Travel Act is heavily grounded in state law.  The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that the Travel Act reflected “a congressional judgment that certain activities of organized crime which were violative 
of state law had become a national problem.  The legislative response was to be commensurate with the scope of the problem.”  
United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 292 (1969); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 907 F. Supp. 785, 791 (D. Del. 1995)  
(“[The Travel Act] makes it a federal offense for an individual to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to promote or 
facilitate the promotion of any activity in violation of the laws of any state.”); United States v. Garramone, 380 F. Supp. 590, 592 
(E.D. Pa. 1974).  (“The statute defines ‘unlawful activity’ to include a business enterprise involving gambling offenses in violation 
of the laws of the state in which they are committed.”).  But see United States v. Campagnuolo , 556 F.2d 1209, 1212 (5th Cir. 
1977) (stating that the Travel Act made it “a federal offense to use interstate facilities to conduct a gambling operation.”).
321 15 U.S.C. § 1172 (2003).
322 18 U.S.C. § 1953(b)(2) (2003).  However, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that the Wagering 
Paraphernalia Act prohibits the mailing of lottery tickets from a state in which the lottery is legal to any other state.  United 
States v. Stuebben, 799 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1986).  
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323  See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 967 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2633 (“Nothing in the exemption, however, 
will permit the transmission of bets and wagers or money by wire as a result of a bet or wager from or to any State whether 
betting is legal in that State or not”); United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that the Wire Act 
“provides a safe harbor for transmissions . . . [when]: (1) [the] betting is legal in both the place of origin and the destination 
of the transmission; and (2) the transmission is limited to mere information that assists in the placing of bets, as opposed 
to including the bets themselves”); United States v. Ross, No. 98 Cr. 1174-1, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22351, at *6 - *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1999).  In Ross, the court noted:
The § 1084(b) exemption by its terms applies only to the transmission of ‘information assisting in 
the placing of bets,’ not to the other acts prohibited in § 1084(a), i.e. transmissions of (1) ‘bets or 
wagers’ or (2) wire communications entitling the recipient to money or credit as a result of bets or 
wagers.  With regard to transmissions of “information assisting in the placing of bets,” the exemption is 
further narrowed by its requirement that the betting at issue be legal in both jurisdictions in which the 
transmission occurs. No exemption applies to the other wire communications proscribed by § 1084(a), 
even if the betting at issue is legal in both jurisdictions.
Ross, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22351, at *6 -*7.
324 GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 36, at 5.
325 Martin v. United States, 389 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968). 
326 Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com. on S. 3357 and H.R. 6736, 81st Cong. 37 (1950) 
(statement of Herzel H.E. Plaine, Office of the Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice).
327 See Malcolm Testimony, supra note 3, available at http://cybercrime.gov/Malcolmtestimony42903.htm (“Traditionally, 
gambling has been one of the staple activities in which organized crime has been involved, and many indictments brought 
against organized crime members have included gambling charges.”).  
328 Compare John Warren Kindt, The Failure to Regulate the Gambling Industry Effectively: Incentives for Perpetual Non-
Compliance, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 219, 241 (2003) (“Of course, legalized gambling is a catalyst for crime.”) and PENNSYLVANIA 
CRIME COMMISSION, RACKETEERING AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE BINGO INDUSTRY (1992) (providing an example of a link 
between organized crime and legal gambling) with Mike Roberts, supra note 11, at 593 (“Initial suspicion that Nevada, and 
legalized gaming in general, fell under the control of organized crime early on and thereafter remained under such control 
is purely speculative . . . . [Furthermore,] there appears to be no recent proof that organized crime, presumably existing 
in the form of large hotels and other publicly traded corporations, still infests the legal gaming business.”), and National 
Gambling Final Report, supra note 1, at 7-13, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/7.pdf (“[B]eyond 
pathological gambling, tracing the relationship between crime and gambling has proven difficult.”).
329 See H.R. REP. No. 967 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2632. See also generally  ESTES KEFAUVER, CRIME 
IN AMERICA 52 (1968) (referring to “[t]he fight to keep bookmakers, the scavengers of crime in America, out of business, 
and to put a crimp in the pocketbooks of the overlords of the underworld who control them . . . .”).
330 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (2003).  Section 1084 states:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce 
of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of 
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or 
foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country in 
which such betting is legal.
Id.
331 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (2003).
332 H.R. REP. No. 967 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2632.  
333 The 1978 Interstate Horseracing Act (which was amended in 2000) allows off-track betting operators in State A to 
accept wagers via telephone or other electronic media for bets on tracks in State B provided that State A’s operators obtain 
the consent of the appropriate horse racing associations and commissions in State B.  15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007 (2000).  
Congress viewed the wagering at issue to be economically beneficial for the states.  See S. REP. NO. 95-1117, at 4 (1978), 
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reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4147 (noting that pari-mutuel “provides substantial revenue to the States through 
direct taxation . . . provides employment opportunities for thousands of individuals, and contributes favorably to the balance 
of trade”).  The rationale for the Act was that “in the limited area of interstate off-track wagering on horseraces, there is 
a need for Federal action to ensure States will continue to cooperate with one another in the acceptance of legal interstate 
wagers.”  15 U.S.C. § 3001 (2000).  The idea seems to be that “[w]hile horseracing is a sport on which one can gamble, 
it would be erroneous to assume that pari-mutuel wagering is the same as other forms of gambling.”  Internet Gambling 
Prohibition Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 3125 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Cong. 59 (2000) (prepared Statement of Stephen Walters, Chairman, Oregon Racing Commission), available at http:
//commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju65222.000/hju65222_0.htm. (last visited Feb 27, 2004).  However, the 
Department of Justice has recently questioned whether this exception is justified.  Id. (statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) (“[W]e do not understand why the parimutuel wagering industry 
should be allowed to accept bets from people in their homes when other forms of gambling have rightly been prohibited 
from doing so.  The same concerns that we have expressed about children and compulsive gamblers having unfettered 
access to gambling via the Internet is true whether the betting is on horse races or on casino games.”).
334 See World Trade Organization, Antigua and Barbuda Request Panel Against U.S. on Gambling and Betting, at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/dsb_24june03_e.htm (June 24, 2003) (“On 24 June 2003, Antigua and 
Barbuda made its first request for the establishment of a panel to look at the United States’ measures affecting the cross-
border supply of gambling and betting services.”).
335 Michael Anastasio, The Enforceability of Gambling Debts: Laws, Policies and Causes of Action, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 8 
(2001).  Professor Joseph Kelly presents a more nuanced version of this claim, writing that “states that have not legalized 
casinos retain strict laws forbidding the enforcement of gambling debts, while those that have legalized casinos have slowly 
relaxed such prohibitions.” Gaming Law Symposium, supra note 11, at 90.
336 See, e.g., Dunes Hotel & Country Club of Las Vegas v. Mayo, 354 N.Y.S.2d 62 (City Civ. Ct. 1974); Nat’l Recovery 
Sys. v. Bryer, 507 A.2d 1226, 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that debts incurred by gamblers to Nevada casinos were 
unenforceable under Nevada law).  
337 James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Right to Recover Money Lent for Gambling Purposes, 74 A.L.R. 5th 369 (1999). 
Nowadays, however, it is possible in Puerto Rico, Nevada and New Jersey to enforce certain legally incurred gambling 
debts through court action and to have this judgment honored by another jurisdiction’s courts through the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.  Gaming Law Symposium, supra note 11, at 97, 114.
338 See, e.g., Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 656 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).  But see, e.g., Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Kommit,  
(stating that “the bank’s alleged and unrefuted deliberate allowance of access to credit from the machine in the gambling 
area of the casino is a circumstance from which . . . knowledge [that the borrowed money would be used to gamble], could 
(but need not) be inferred”). 577 N.E. 2d 639,642 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
339 Anastasio, supra note 335, at 22.
340 Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 4419 Before House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 
107th Cong. (2000) (statement of Gregory A. Baer, Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, Department of the 
Treasury), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba65225.000/hba65225_0.HTM. (last visited Feb. 
27, 2004).
341 See Kelly, supra note 17, at 163 (describing the arguments put forth by both sides in Providian); see also Providian Nat’l 
Bank v. Haines, No. CV9808858 (Cal. Super. Ct.) (filed July 23, 1998) (unpublished opinion).
342 Anastasio, supra note 335, at 10. 
343 As noted by Jon Patterson,
Providian, one of the largest credit card issuers in the United States . . . banned the use of its credit 
or debit cards for Internet gambling . . . . Wells Fargo Bank modified its Visa and MasterCard credit 
agreements and completely banned the use of its cards for online gambling . . . . Bank of America has a 
policy of denying authorization for any transaction that is identified as an Internet gambling transaction.
Jon Patterson, Internet Gambling and the Banking Industry: An Unsure Bet, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 665, 688-89 (2002).
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344 RICO prohibits certain conduct, including the “collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C §§ 1962(a), (c) (2003).
345 In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 497 (E.D. La. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff failed to prove the 
elements of a RICO claim thus noting the case did not concern an illegal gambling debt).
346 Jubelirer v. MasterCard Int’l., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (holding that the credit card companies’ 
relationship with the Internet gaming operator fell short of the requisite participation in the operation or management of an 
enterprise).
347 As one commentator notes, 
It is important to note that parties seeking to bar the enforceability of an Internet gambling debt on 
grounds of illegality may need to overcome the consequences of their own conduct.  Under the in pari 
delicto doctrine, an Internet gambler who engages in Internet gambling that is deemed illegal, may be 
barred from asserting, for example, a RICO cause of action due to his or her own involvement in the 
illegal activity.
Anastasio, supra note 335, at 63.
348 Id. at 26.
349 This is the case for credit card associations, such as Visa or MasterCard, which merely establish operating standards 
and do not offer credit card services either to cardholders or to merchants.  In contrast, full-service credit card companies, 
including Discover, provide credit card services to both cardholders and merchants, thereby lessening the number of 
intermediaries in the transaction.  See GAO Report, supra note 75, at 8-10. 
350 See generally id. at 10.
351 This may involve simply misusing the credit card company’s transaction codes (viz. not identifying themselves as 
an Internet gambling operator) or illegitimate factoring, where the Internet gambling operator “submits credit card 
transactions through another merchant’s terminal using that merchant’s identification number and merchant category code, 
and pays that merchant a percentage of the submitted transactions.” See GAO Report, supra note 75, at 22.  
352 Anastasio, supra note 335, at 31.
353 Some of these arguments may be undermined by the fact that, due to the riskier nature of Internet gambling charges, 
Visa and MasterCard have managed to identify several Internet gaming merchants and to charge them a 7% fee of the 
gross revenue charged in contrast to the 2% fee applied to other Internet merchants.  Patterson, supra note 344, at 694 
n.7. Despite the occasional customer refusing to pay his credit card bill, the credit card companies and banks may have 
still reaped a healthy profit. It has been estimated that credit card companies and banks made $112 million from Internet 
gambling fees in 2000.  Id. at 668.
354 See Press Release, Attorney General Bob Butterworth, Western Union Cuts Off Sports Betting Accounts (Dec. 23, 
1997), at http://myfloridalegal.com/852562220065EE67/0/06268A62EB5817BA852565B50046B857?Open&Highlight=2,
Western,Union,Cuts,Off,Sports,Betting,Accounts.  
355 See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Agreement Reached with Paypal to Bar 
New Yorkers from Online Gambling (Aug. 21, 2002), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug21a_02.html.  
While online gamblers may find it difficult to use PayPal, other third-party online payment providers like NetTeller and 
FirePay are stepping in to fill PayPal’s place in the realm of online gambling.  See Fred Faust, What’s Up (and Down) 
with Internet Gaming Credit Card Transactions!, GAMBLING TIMES MAGAZINE, Winter 2002-2003, available at http://
www.gamblingtimes.com/writers/ffaust/ffaust_winter2002-03.html.
356  Sebastian Sinclair, Some Bumps in the E-Gambling Road, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT V 61, 69 (Mark Balestra ed., 
2002).  
357 National Gambling Final Report, supra note 1, at 5-12, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/5.pdf. 
358 H.R. 2579 I.H., 107th Cong. (2001).
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359 H.R. 4419 R.H., 106th Cong. (2000); see also S. 627, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 21, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 3004 I.H., 
107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2579 I.H., 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 556 E.H., 107th Cong. (introduced 2001).
360 H.R. 4419 R.H., 106th Cong. (2000); see also S. 627, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 21, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 3004 I.H., 
107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2579 I.H.,107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 556 E.H.,107th Cong. (introduced 2001).
361 H.R. 2579 I.H., 107th Cong. (2001).
362 See, e.g., H.R. 3004 I.H., 107th Cong. (2001); S. 627, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 21, 108th Cong. (2003).
363 S. 627, 108th Congress. (2003). 
364 Id.
365 See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 75 (“Many large U.S. credit card issuers also use codes to deny authorization for 
Internet gambling transactions, and U.S.-based banks do not accept gambling Web sites as merchants.  Despite attempts to 
circumvent these efforts by using improper coding, the success of these restrictions has caused gaming analysts to lower 
their 2003 revenue projections for the on-line gaming industry.”)
366 Charlies Crawford & Melody Wigdahl, Internet Payment Solutions, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT V 77, 88-89 (2002).
367 Audio Tape: Interview with Dan Feldman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, and Kenneth Dreifach, Chief of New York 
Attorney General’s Internet Bureau (Mar. 20, 2003), available at http://www.igamingnews.com/index.cfm?page=desktop3
&confid=40 (explaining why these actions have been taken and on what grounds).
368 See GAO Report, supra note 75, at 24.  
369 Id. at 34.
370 See Crawford & Wigdahl, supra note 366, at 85.
371 Id. at 93.
372 H.R. 21 R.H., 108th Cong. (2003).
373 See Schwarz, supra note 167, at 1061-63.  In his article The Internet Gambling Fallacy Craps Out, Mr. Schwarz notes:
[E]ven if the Internet gambling operation is based entirely outside of the United States, and even if the 
monetary instruments drawn on United States banks are deposited in accounts outside of the United 
States, the instruments must still reenter the United States for purposes of clearing.  As such, the foreign 
gambling operation is dependent upon the U.S. banking system for receiving the funds.  This reliance 
therefore provides a mechanism which can be used to eliminate an Internet gambling business’s ability to 
accept monetary instruments drawn on United States banks.
Id. at 1062. 
374 Several states already have legislation that may be helpful.  For example, at least eleven states have money-transmitter 
laws targeting non-bank businesses that offer certain electronic payment methods.  See Judith Rinearson, Regulation of 
Electronic Stored Value Payment Products Issued by Non-Banks under State ‘Money Transmitter’ Licensing Laws, 58 
BUS. LAW. 317 (2002).  Furthermore, it is a federal criminal offense for an unlicensed money transmitting business to issue 
payment products.  See 18 U.S.C § 1960 (2003).  
375 Crawford & Wigdahl, supra note 367, at 92.
376 President’s Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of 
Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of the Internet (Mar. 2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
unlawful.htm#FRAMEWRK (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
377 This is a variation on the “technological neutrality” arguments that have been advanced in other contexts.  See, e.g., 
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Thomas J. Smedinghoff & Ruth Hill Bro, Moving with Change: Electronic Signature Legislation as a Vehicle for 
Advancing E-Commerce, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 723, 734 (1999) (“[L]egislation addressing one particular 
form of electronic authentication (e.g., digital signatures) may have the unintended consequence of precluding other 
methods of authentication that might also be appropriate, and thus inhibit the development of other technologies that might 
be equal or superior to digital signatures.”). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 39 (2002) (“[W]hen 
future uses of a technology cannot be predicted – then leaving the technology uncontrolled is a better way of helping it find 
the right sort of innovation.”).
378 DiGregory Statement I, supra note 49 (“Legislation that is tied to a particular technology may quickly become obsolete 
and require further amendment. As a result, we believe it prudent to identify the conduct we are trying to prohibit, and then 
prohibit that conduct in technology-neutral terms.”).
379 S. 474 R.S., 105th Cong. (2000). 
380 Id.
381 See supra Part V(A).
382 H.R. 556 EH, 107th Cong. (2002).  For a state example of this double standard, there is Oregon’s legislation against 
Internet gambling that prohibits the collection of certain Internet gaming debts but permits the collection of non-Internet 
gaming debts.  See SB 318, effective July 17, 1997, NRS 465.091.
383 See, e.g., S. 627, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 556 EH, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 3004 IH, 107th Cong.(2001).
384 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 107-339, pt. 1 (2001).  “Its primary purpose is to give U.S. law enforcement a new, more 
effective tool for combating offshore Internet gambling sites that illegally extend their services to U.S. residents via the 
Internet.”  Id.
385 See Lynch, supra note 6, at 180 (noting that the number of telephone sports gambling services in Antigua increased six-
fold during the 1990’s).  Lynch argues that off-shore telephone gambling operations pose risks of fraud, money laundering, 
and pathological gambling—problems frequently cited with respect to Internet gambling.  Id. at 182-83.
386 David H. Lantzer, Internet Gaming Tax Regulation: Can Old Laws Learn New Tricks?, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 281, 288 (2002) 
(asking the question “whether Congress can regulate Internet gaming that is restricted to intrastate systems such as closed 
circuit Internet gaming, purchasing state lottery tickets via the Internet, or pari-mutuel betting using the Internet”).
387 Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 1, 26 Stat. 465 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994)); see also In re Rapier, 
143 U.S. 110 (1892) (upholding application of 1890 Act under Congress’s power “to establish post-offices and post-
roads”). 
388 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2003);  see also United States v. Kelley, 254 F. Supp. 9, 15-16 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966) (holding that application of Wire Act is valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause)  (reversed, 
in part, on other grounds by United States v. Kelly, 395 F.2d 727 (2nd Cir. 1968)); Marshall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999, 
1004 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that the Travel Act does not exceed Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause). 
389 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 801, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of Title 18 of the U.S. Code).
390 See, e.g., United States v. Abramson, 553 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 
1972); United States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1972).  In Riehl, the Court notes:
[G]ambling has been found by Congress to be in the class of activities which exerts an effect upon 
interstate commerce . . . .  Congress has chosen to protect commerce and the instrumentalities of 
commerce not from all illegal gambling activities but from those it deems of major proportions.  We may 
not substitute our judgment as to where the line might have been drawn.
Riehl, 400 F.2d at 458.
391 But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (overturning a federal law that had, using the Commerce Clause, 
criminalized the possession of a gun near a school).  Lopez may suggest a greater tendency on the part of the Supreme 
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Court to scrutinize federal powers asserted under the Commerce Clause.  
392 One of the “findings” stated in the Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act was that “Internet gambling is 
a major cause of debt collection problems for insured depository institutions and the consumer credit industry.”  H.R. 556, 
107th Cong. § 2(3) (2002).  Also found in this bill’s “Background and Need for Legislation” is the following statement: 
“problem gambling including problem Internet gambling can lead to personal and family hardships, such as lost savings, 
excessive debt, bankruptcy, foreclosed mortgages, and divorce.”  H.R. REP. NO. 107-339 (2001).
393 NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 7-14, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/
reports/7.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).  The Commission also noted that, in the U.S., brick and mortar casinos extend 
billions of dollars in loans to customers each year with interest rates ranging from 3% to 10%.  Id.
394 Many brick and mortar casinos in the United States have opposed online gaming and supported the earlier online gaming 
bans.  See Patterson, supra note 343, at 681.  Cf. Matt Richtel, Nevada Approves Online Gambling, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 
2001, available at http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/CPC/archive/gambling/05GAMB.html (“Las Vegas’s casinos are not 
united in their desire to move onto the Internet. Until recently, in fact, many of them advocated keeping online gambling 
illegal as a way of trying to kill competition from overseas.”).
395 See Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary on H.R. 3125, 106th Cong. 59 (2000) (statement by Kevin DiGregory) (hereinafter “DiGregory Statement II”).  
While before the House Subcommittee, Mr. DiGregory stated:
The Department [of Justice] urges Congress to identify the conduct that it is trying to prohibit and then 
to prohibit that conduct in technology-neutral terms. The fact that gambling, an age-old crime, has 
gone high-tech and can now be done through the Internet is no reason to pass new laws that specifically 
target the Internet for regulation. Passing laws that are technology-specific can create overlapping and 
conflicting laws, prohibiting the same activity but with different legal standards and punishments.
Id.
396 H.R. 2143, 108th Cong. (2003).
397 See DiGregory Statement I, supra note 57.
398 See Brown, supra note 17, at 618-27.
399 For example, the House version of the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997 defines “bets or wagers,” in part, as 
“the staking or risking by any person of something of value upon the outcome of a contest of chance or a future contingent 
event not under the control or influence of the person, upon an agreement or understanding that the person or another 
person will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome . . . .” S. 474, 105th Cong. (1997).  The Leach-
LeFalce Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, as passed by the House in 2001, defines “bets or wagers,” in part, as “the 
staking or risking by any person of something of value upon the outcome of a contest of others, a sporting event, or a game 
subject to chance . . . .” Leach-LeFalce Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, H.R. 556 RFS, 107th Cong. § 3(b)(1)(A) 
(2002). The Comprehensive Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2002 defines “bets or wagers,” in part, as “the staking or 
risking by any person of something of value upon any contest or game based in whole or part on chance, including a lottery; 
one or more sporting events or contests, or one or more performances of the participants in such events or contests . . . .”  
Comprehensive Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2002, S. 3006, 107th Cong. § 2(9)(A)-(B)(2002).
400 This has been suggested in the following bills: Comprehensive Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2002, S. 3006, 
107th Cong. § 2(2)(B) (2002), (adding “satellite,” “microwave,” and “mobile” to the list of media covered); Comprehensive 
Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000, H.R. 5020, 106th Cong. § 2(2)(A) (2000) (changing “wire communication” to 
“communication”); Combating Illegal Gambling Reform and Modernization Act, H.R. 3215, 107th Cong. § 2(2)(A) (2002) 
(changing “wire communication” to “communication”); Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997, S. 474, 105th Cong. 
§ 1085 (1997) (changing “wire communication” to “communication”); 1995 Crime Prevention Act, S. 1495, 104th Cong. 
Title XV § 1501(1)(B) (1995) (changing “wire communication” to “wire or electronic communication”).
401 See Anthony Cabot, Why Internet Gambling May Frustrate Public Policy, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT V 187, 196 
(2002).
